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NOTES
LIABILITY OF A MANUFACTURER FOR PRODUCTS
DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED BY THE GOVERNMENT
The federal government buys billions of dollars worth of products and
equipment each year. These products, like those sold to ordinary consumers,
may contain design defects which can cause injuries or death to government
employees or other parties. Persons injured by defective products owned by the
federal government, however, may be unable to recover damages from the
government because of limitations on tort actions imposed by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity which have not been fully abrogated by the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' As a result, often the only recourse for individuals injured by
products owned by the government is to sue the manufacturer of the defective
product. Plaintiffs suing manufacturers, however, are faced with some long-
standing defenses, which effectively can insulate from liability a manufacturer
' 28 U.S.C. 55 1346(b), 2402, 2671-2680 (1976). Prior to the enactment of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 1946, the doctrine of sovereign immunity had barred recovery in tort
actions against the government. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
In Cohens, the United States Supreme Court stated that the United States cannot be sued without
its consent. Id. at 380. The FICA, however, allows suit for injury caused:
... by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claim-
ant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. S 1346(b) (1976).
While the FTCA drastically alters the law concerning tort actions by private individuals
against the federal government, it does not constitute a full waiver of immunity. The Act has
been interpreted by the Supreme Court to preclude suit on a theory of strict liability. Laird v.
Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 799 (1972). Furthermore, the Act includes a list of exceptions to the federal
government's waiver of immunity. 28 U.S.C. 5 2680 (1976). Two exceptions are particularly
relevant to cases in which a plaintiff wishes to sue the government for injuries caused by a defec-
tively designed product owned by the government. These exceptions are the "discretionary func-
tion" exception and the exception excluding claims arising out of combatant activities of the
Armed Forces during war. 28 U.S.C. 5 2680(a), (j) (1976). The discretionary function exception
precludes suits arising out of acts or omissions by government officials at the "planning level" of
government. This exception, however, does allow suits based on acts or omissions at the "opera-
tional level" of the federal government. See Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discre-
tionary Function Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161, 168 (1976). In general, suits for in-
juries caused by products owned by the government may be barred by courts which view the
government's decisions concerning the design and use of the products as "planning level" deci-
sions. Decisions are particularly apt to be considered planning level decisions if the government
has .
 consciously balanced policy considerations in arriving at these decisions. See generally Case
Comment, Scope of the Discretionag Function Exception Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 67 GEO. L. J.
879, 884-85, 892-93 (1979). Thus, the discretionary function exception represents a substantial
barrier to recovery against the government. The second exception to the FTCA pertaining to
claims arising out of combatant activities also has proved to be a major hurdle to servicemen.
Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950), active-
duty member of the Armed Forces generally have been denied FTCA relief for injuries incurred
incident to service. Graham, Products Liability and Tort Risk Distribution in Government Contract Pro-
grams, 20 A.F. L. REV. 331, 397 (1978).
1025
1026	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 23:1025
which has manufactured the product in accordance with the government's
specifications.
The defenses available to manufacturers reflect the role which the govern-
ment plays in the contracting process. When the government enters contracts
for the manufacture of products, it frequently provides detailed specifications
which contractors are bound to follow when they accept the contract. 2 Contrac-
tors which have complied with the government's contract specifications in per-
2 See Checchi, Federal Procurement and Commercial Procurement under the U. C. C. — A Com-
parison, 11 PUB. CONT. L. J. 358, 362 (1980). Unlike the private consumer, the government fre-
quently plays a direct role in determining the design of the products it buys. Id. at 377. The ex-
tent to which a product's design is mandated by the government may vary, depending on the
method of contract formation. Two common methods of government contract formation are for-
mal advertising and negotiation. Id. at 362. The Defense Acquisition Regulations and Federal
Procurement Regulations direct military and civilian agencies to award contracts by formal
advertising whenever "feasible" and "practicable." Id. Formal advertising generally is used to
procure existing items which the procuring agency describes in detail in its bid specifications. Id.
The formally advertised procurement consists of the following basic steps: (a) preparation of an
Invitation for Bids (IFB) by the procuring agency; (b) publicizing the IFB; (c) submission of bids
by prospective contractors; and (d) awarding the contract. J. PAUL, UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS 145 (1964). Among other items, the IFB may contain
design specifications, performance specifications, or purchase descriptions, separately or in com-
bination. Id. at 147. Bids submitted by prospective contractors must be responsive to the terms
and conditions of the IFB. M. at 150. The contracting officer has no authority to award a'contract
to a nonresponsive bidder and any contract so awarded is invalid. Id. Thus, when the govern-
ment engages in formal advertising, the seller (contractor) is presented with a formalized contract
(i.e. a contract of adhesion), with no real opportunity to negotiate or modify its terms. Checchi,
supra, at 363. This arrangement may be contrasted with the typical private sale of a product, in
which the purchasing consumer rather than the seller frequently is presented with an adhesion
contract. The government, however, does not always dictate the detailed design of the product.
As an alternative, the government may provide only performance specifications, leaving the
details of design to the contractor. PAUL, supra, at 261. See note 52 infra for a discussion of design
versus performance specifications.
If a procurement fits within the ambit of certain statutory exceptions to the general re-
quirement of procurement by formal advertising, the procuring agency may issue a Request for
Proposals (RFP) and procure an item by negotiation. PAUL, supra, at 163. Negotiation is the
method of procurement often used to procure items not in being at the time of the RFP. Checchi,
supra, at 362. Among other items, the RFP will contain a Statement of Work, including
references to applicable specifications. PAUL, supra, at 172-73. Interested contractors submit
technical and pricing proposals. Checchi, supra, at 362. Then, if a contractor is still "in the run-
ning," preliminary negotiations typically occur regarding the details of the work to be per-
formed, cost pricing analyses and the delivery schedule. Id.; PAUL, supra, at 56. A formal con-
tract then is executed. PAUL, supra, at 191. Negotiation has more flexibility with respect to the
bargaining process than formal advertising. Negotiation allows alternatives to the proposed pro-
curement and revisions to the statement of work, specifications, and other non-standard terms
and conditions. Id. at 163. Even in negotiation, however, the opportunity to "negotiate" con-
tract provisions is severely limited by the mandates of the procurement regulations. Checchi,
supra, at 363. If the contractor has in-house specifications which are more suitable for perform-
ance than those initially proposed by the procuring agency, the prospective contractor must sug-
gest them at an early stage in the negotiations, preferably in his proposal. PAUL, supra, at 178.
A proposal may be accepted "as is" and create a binding contract without the opportunity for
further negotiation. Id. at 171. If the prospective contractor proposes substituted specifications
which differ markedly from those of the agency, however, the proposal could be considered non-
responsive and may be rejected. Id. at 178. It is sometimes possible to avoid rejection by submit-
ting substitute specifications as an alternative basis of contracting. Id.
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forming work pursuant to the contract have had the benefit of two major
defenses against plaintiffs injured by defectively designed products. For iden-
tification purposes, these defenses are referred to in this note as the "contract
specification" defense and the "government contract" defense. 3 In general,
the contract specification defense allows a contractor to escape liability for the
defective design of a product it manufactures if the contractor has fully com-
plied with the government's specifications, the injury complained of is at-
tributable to a flaw in the specifications, and the specifications were not so ob-
viously defective and dangerous that a competent contractor would not have
followed them.* In contrast, the government contract defense provides a type of
immunity to a public contractor who performs in accordance with government
specifications.' Moreover, the government contract defense may provide a
more complete defense than the contract specification defense. Taken together,
these defenses present major barriers to plaintiffs who attempt to recover for in-
juries caused by defectively designed products which were manufactured in
compliance with government specifications.
Recent cases have injected considerable uncertainty into this area of the
law. Although the government contract and the contract specification defenses
have been recognized since at least the early 1900's, the government contract
defense only recently has been applied in products liability cases. With two
somewhat distinct defenses now available to manufacturers, it is unclear which
of the two standards will be applied in a particular case. Furthermore, there is a
split of authority as to whether the contract specification defense is viable in a
products liability suit based on a theory of strict liability or breach of warranty.
In addition, the courts have given scant attention to whether a manufacturer
has a duty to warn of a product's dangers even if the contract specification or
government contract defense shields it from liability for the defective design of
the product.
This note will analyze the scope of a manufacturer's liability for design de-
fects in products it has sold to the federal government. In order to analyze
properly the scope of the manufacturer's liability, section I of this note will
discuss briefly the standards of liability used by the courts in typical products
liability actions for design defects not necessarily involving products sold to the
government. The cause of action for failure to warn also will be discussed.
These standards will be viewed in the context of the three common theories of
products liability: negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Section
II will analyze the defenses which have evolved in cases in which a manufac-
turer or contractor has complied with the work or product specifications of the
government. First, the contract specification defense will be examined. Next,
3 See text and notes at notes 27-98 infra for a discussion of the contract specification
defense. See text and notes at notes 118-228 infra for a discussion of the government contract
defense. These defenses are not always referred to in these terms; the titles have been chosen for
convenience. Moreover, some courts have not treated these defenses as distinct. See note 20 infra.
See text and note at note 21 infra.
See text and note at note 136 infra.
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the related but distinct government contract defense will be examined. Par-
ticular emphasis will be placed on cases involving the sale of products and the
applicability of the defenses under the three theories of products liability. Sec-
tion III will suggest appropriate standards for determining liability in future
cases involving products sold pursuant to government specifications. It will be
submitted that the government contract defense as articulated by some courts
is overly broad and that a defense similar to the contract specification defense
generally represents an appropriate standard of liability for design defects.
Manufacturers should be required to warn, however, of defects or dangers
associated with their products which are or should be obvious to the manufac-
turer but are not obvious to the government.
I. MANUFACTURER LIABILITY FOR DESIGN
DEFECTS AND INADEQUATE WARNINGS
In order to comprehend and analyze the standards of liability which the
courts have applied to manufacturers which have built products pursuant to
government specifications, it is necessary to be familiar with the basic elements
of more typical products liability actions not involving government specifica-
tions. Products liability suits involve defective products. In general, products
become defective through mismanufacture, mistakes in design, or through in-
adequate warnings of the product's dangers. 6 This note is concerned primarily
with causes of action based on design defects and inadequate warnings. Hence,
it is necessary to survey briefly the elements of a products liability suit which is
predicated on either or both of these defects. This survey will examine these ac-
tions in view of each of the three common theories of products liability:
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. One or all of these theories
may support an action for defective design or inadequate warning, depending
on the jurisdiction in which the action-is brought.
A. Design Defects
In a typical design defect case a plaintiff injured by a product tries to show
that the manufacturer should have designed the product in a manner which
would have avoided the injury to the plaintiff.' With respect to each theory of
liability for design defects, however, the elements which a plaintiff must prove
are slightly different.
To prove that a product was negligently designed, a plaintiff must show
that the manufacturer failed to exercise due care in designing its product so
that it was reasonably safe for the purposes for which it was intended. 8 In com-
parison, a plaintiff suing under a strict liability theory must prove that the
product was "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
6 Graham, supra note I, at 345-46.
7 Id.
" See 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 7.01[1] (1981).
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consumer" at the time of sale. 9
 A plaintiff suing for injuries caused by a defec-
tively designed product also may allege a breach of warranty as a theory of
recovery." Typically, as an incident of sale, a seller of goods implieclly war-
rants that the goods are merchantable." Merchantable goods are free from
defects and are fit for the ordinary purposes for which the goods are sold.' 2
9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 402A (1965). Section 402A provides as
follows:
S 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Con-
sumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
The elements necessary to state a cause of action under Section 402A have been stated as follows:
(1) The defendant sold a product.
(2) The product was in a defective condition.
(3) The defective condition was unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer.
(4) The seller was in the business of selling said products.
(5) Said product was expected to and did reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in condition (that is, the defect existed at the time of sale).
(6) Said defect was the proximate cause of the personal injuries or property
damage incurred by the consumer or user.
(7) Standard allegations as to jurisdiction and damages.
See Graham, supra note 1, at 343.
Some courts try to explain the difference between the negligence and strict liability
standards by stating that the emphasis in strict liability is on the nature or condition of the prod-
uct rather than the conduct of the defendant, and, thus, that fault is irrelevant. 2 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5 16A[4][f][iv] — 16A[4]1flliv][A]. Commentators have suggested,
however, that in practice it is difficult to make meaningful distinctions between the two theories.
Id. at 16A14][f][iv]. The theories tend to merge because in seeking to determine what is a "defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous" under the strict liability theory, many courts use a
risk/utility, or cost/benefit analysis. In other words, consideration is given to whether the risk of
injury from design outweighs the usefulness of the product. Id. A similar analysis must be con-
ducted under a negligence theory to give meaning to the standard of "due care" and to deter-
mine whether the manufacturer has made its product "reasonably safe." Id. Nevertheless, most
states adopting strict liability continue to state that it applies to design, as well as to manufactur-
ing defects, even though it is difficult in practice to make meaningful distinctions between the
strict liability standards being applied and a negligence standard. Id. A few states have taken the
approach that only a negligence standard applies. Id. The Model Uniform Products Liability Act
would restrict actions for design defects to a negligence theory. 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 8, 5 7.02.
10 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5 [1]. The Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) is the principal body of law governing actions based on breach of warranty. Graham,
supra note 1, at 350. See generally 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5 [1], [1][c]. Warranties
may be express, U.C.C. 5 2-313, or implied by law. U.C.C. SS 2-314, 2-315.
" U.C.C. 1 2-314.
' 2 Id. See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, Supra note 8, 5 [1]. Under certain circumstances,
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Thus, if goods are sold in a defective condition, the seller breaches his implied
warranty of merchantability." To recover from a manufacturer under breach
of warranty theory, a plaintiff only needs to show that the goods were defective
at the time of sale, and that some injury, economic or personal, was caused by
the defect."
B. Failure to Warn
Instead of suing under a theory of negligence, strict liability, or breach of
warranty for an alleged defect in design, a plaintiff injured by a product can
allege that the seller failed to warn of the dangers associated with the product. 15
An otherwise properly manufactured and well-designed product may be found
to be "defective" if it is sold without an adequate warning of the danger
associated with the use of the product." Conversely, a manufacturer
sometimes may avoid liability for the design defects of its products if it provides
an adequate warning of such defects to the ultimate user of the product."
A claim of failure to warn can arise in actions predicated on negligence,
strict liability, or even breach of warranty." Commentators have suggested
that under each theory the standard of liability is the same: a manufacturer is
liable for an inadequate warning if it knew, or by the use of its special
where there is reliance by the buyer on the seller's skill and judgment, and where the seller has
reason to know of a particular purpose for which goods are bought, an implied warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose also can arise. U.C.C. S 2-315.
to U.C.C. $ 2-314.
14 See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5 [1]. Thus, in addition to suing under a
theory of negligence and/or strict liability, a buyer seeking to recover for injuries caused by a
design defect may sue for breach of warranty. Even when suing under a breach of warranty
theory, however, plaintiffs still may be bound by a negligence standard in showing that a defect
in design exists. See, e.g., Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 464 (E.D.N.Y.
1971).
Difficulties arise under a warranty theory when third parties, not the buyer, seek to
recover. Traditionally, a remedy in warranty, being based on contract principles, was available
only to the buyer and only against the immediate seller. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5
[1][a]. In 1960 the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), abolished this privity requirement, and many states have followed
suit to varying degrees. See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5 [1][b]. The U.C.C. provides
three alternatives for states to adopt for the partial or complete abolition of privity as a defense in
breach of warranty actions. See U.C.C. S 2-318. Other provisions of the U.C.C. which may pre-
sent hurdles to potential plaintiffs are those relating to disclaimer and notice. Depending on
various state interpretations, a seller may be able to disclaim or limit warranties, and there may
be a requirement of timely notice by the buyer to the seller in order for the buyer to invoke his
right to recover. See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5 [1][c].
15 See Graham, supra note 1, at 348. Graham notes that this theory of recovery may be
popular because often it is easier to prove that a warning was inadequate than that a product was
defectively designed. The reason is that proof of failure to warn requires less expert testimony.
Id.
16 See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5 16A[4][f][vi].
17 See Graham, supra note 1, at 349. See also I FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, S
11.04[3].
'8 See Graham, supra note 1, at 348.
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knowledge it should have known, of the product's danger or, if it reasonably
could have foreseen the dangerous use to which the product might be put. 19
The foregoing discussion provides an outline of the key concepts involved
in a typical products liability action based on a design defect or an inadequate
warning. In a "typical" products liability case, however, the manufacturer has
placed an article into the stream of commerce with little, if any, input from the
intended user with respect to the design characteristics or safety features of the
product. A new variable enters the equation when the manufacturer is asked to
produce a product which fully complies with specifications provided by the
government. The question arises whether it is appropriate to hold a manufac-
turer liable for a flaw in those specifications, when it had little or no discretion
to change them. In response to this question, courts have recognized two close-
ly related but distinct defenses for manufacturers: the contract specification
defense and the government contract defense. In order to assess the merits of
insulating manufacturers from liability under these defenses, the operation of
the defenses must be examined in some detail.
II. PRODUCTS BUILT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH BUYER SPECIFICATIONS
Depending upon the circumstances, there are two defenses to products
liability actions available to manufacturers who build products according to
government specifications. 2° The two defenses are referred to in this note as the
15 See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 646-47 (4th ed. 1971). See also Graham, supra
note 1, at 348; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, comments h and j (1965). The
Model Uniform Products Liability Act also adopts a negligence standard of liability. See 2
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 16A[4][f][vi]. In an action based on breach of warranty,
the standard is likely to be substantially the same as the standard in strict liability actions, which
essentially is a negligence standard of liability. See Case Comment, The Duty to Warn within the Im-
plied Warranty of Merchantability: Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 41 OHIO ST. L. J. 747, 758-59
(1980). Frumer and Friedman, however, have suggested that there should be a different standard
of liability for failure to warn in a strict liability action. They state that bringing suit under a
theory of strict liability should eliminate the question of whether a manufacturer "knew or should
have known" of certain dangers in the product or the need for a particular warning. In such ac-
tions, the focus of inquiry should be whether, assuming the manufacturer knew of the propensities
of the product, the warning was reasonable. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8,
16A[4][f][vi].
Many courts hold that the duty to warn is subject to the caveat that there is no duty to
warn where the danger is obvious or where the injured person, his employer or an expert or
technically trained person under whom he was working, knew of the danger. See, e.g. , Jacobson
v. Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263, 1272-73 (9th Cir. 1969); Littlehale v. E.I. du-
Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 798-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.
1967); Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 639-40, 549 P.2d 1383, 1395 (1976).
a° Although not all courts explicitly have recognized that there are two defenses, several
courts and commentators have discerned two distinct defenses, stemming from separate lines of
cases. See, e.g., Littlehale v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. at 791, 802 n.17;
Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429, 435, 194 N.W.2d 767, 772
(1971); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 364 A.2d 43, 46 (1976), ard, 154 N.J.
Super. 407, 410, 381 A.2d 805, 806 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978); Strict
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contract specification defense and the government contract defense. In general,
the contract specification defense provides that a contractor is not liable if
damage or injury results from specifications provided by the party employing
the contractor, so long as the specifications were not so obviously defective and
dangerous that a competent contractor would have declined to follow them. 2 '
This defense is based on negligence principles and applies to private as well as
government contracts. 22
 The government contract defense provides that a
public contractor is not liable for damage resulting "incidentally" or
"necessarily" from the specifications, plans or directions of a government
authority." Many courts have described the defense as a "sharing" by the
contractor of the government's immunity." Thus, the government contract
defense is based not on general tort principles, but on considerations of public
policy which have led courts to conclude that under certain circumstances con-
tractors ought to be able to share the immunity of the public body from suit."
In contrast to the contract specification defense, the government contract
defense is available only where the manufacturer contracts directly with the
government. In addition, unlike the contract specification defense, the govern-
ment contract defense may insulate contractors from suit even when the
specifications or plans provided by the government are obviously dangerous."
Because of the distinct characteristics of these defenses, it is necessary to con-
sider each defense separately. Each defense will be examined to determine how
the courts have applied it to manufacturers of products sold to the federal
government and whether any consistent standards of application have
emerged.
A. The Contract Specification Defense
This defense seems to have originated in Ryan v. Feeny & Sheehan Building
Co." In Ryan, a building canopy constructed for the United States government
Liability in Military Aviation Cases — Should it Apply?, FIFTEENTH ANNUAL SMU AIR LAW SYM-
POSIUM E-18 (April 2-4 1981); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382, 387 (1966).
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 comment a (1965). See also PROssER,
supra note 19, at 681. Courts have stated that in circumstances where the danger in a product is
extraordinary or obvious, a contractor has a duty not to proceed or, if appropriate, to issue warn-
ings. See, e.g. , McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Ky. 1980).
22 See text and note at note 34, infra. One court has stated that cases allowing the defense
"stand only for the proposition that there is no negligence in following the design of another
unless the design is such that the defectiveness was sufficiently obvious to alert a reasonably com-
petent technician to the danger." Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 83 (5th
Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for misapplication of conflict of laws rules, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). The ra-
tionale of the rule has been said to lie in the negligence concept of duty: "[1]iability in negligence
arises only if the independent contractor has breached a duty owed to persons whose injuries
proximately resulted from the breach.... An independent contractor owes no duty to third per-
sons to judge the plans, specifications or instructions which he has merely contracted to follow."
Hunt v. Blasius, 74 III. 2d 203, 209, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1978).
22 See text and notes at notes 134-36 infra.
24 Id.
23 See text and notes at notes 137-42 infra.
26 See text and notes at notes 143-44 infra.
27 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924).
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by a private contractor collapsed under a heavy snow fall, killing the plaintiff's
decedent, a government employee. 28 The New York Court of Appeals held that
"[a] builder or contractor is justified in relying upon the plans and specifica-
tions which he has contracted to follow unless they are so apparently defective
that an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence would be put upon notice that
the work was dangerous and likely to cause injury."" Since Ryan, this rule has
become firmly established as a defense for independent contractors against
negligence actions. 3° The defense has been raised successfully by contractors
performing federal as well as state and private contracts." It remains unclear,
however, whether the defense should apply against actions based on theories of
strict liability32 or breach of warranty. 33 Jurisdictions are split over the applica-
bility of the defense to claims of strict liability and few courts have considered
the question with respect to actions for breach of warranty. Thus, the success of
the defense may depend on what theory of liability a plaintiff pursues. Accord-
ingly, the defense will be discussed in the context of each theory.
' 6 Id. at 47, 145 N.E. at 322.
29 Id. at 46, 145 N.E. at 321-22. The Ryan court was the same court that decided the
landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), which
abolished the privity requirement for recovery in negligence in a products liability case. This
seems to have lent additional authority to the rule. See Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17
Utah 2d 37, 404 P.2d 33, 36 (1965).
3° See, e.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 375 (4th Cir. 1973); Person v.
Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832, 836 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951);
Davis v. Henderlong Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Roth v. Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 108 F. Supp. 390, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des
Moines Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88, 90 (Del. 1977); Rawls v. Ziegler, 107 So. 2d 601, 605 (Fla.
1958); Hunt v. Blasius, 74 111. 2d 203, 209, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1978); McCabe Powers Body
Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Ky. 1980); Arnold v. Edelman, 375 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Mo.
1964); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 205 Neb. 292, 297, 287 N.W.2d 430, 433 (1980); Russell v.
Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 173, 121 A.2d 781, 782 (1956); Lydecker v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders, 91 N.J.L. 622, 626, 103 A. 251, 253 (1918) (This case arguably falls under
the government contract defense, discussed in text and notes at notes 118-228 infra, since it
preceded Ryan and involved a government contract. The rule expressed by the court, however,
virtually is identical to the Ryan rule.); Tipton v. Clower, 67 N.M. 388, 394, 356 P.2d 46, 49
(1960); Leininger v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2c1 37, 41, 404 P.2d 33, 36 (1965).
Some courts amplify the contract specification defense by stating that if the party pro-
viding the specifications discovers the danger, or it is obvious to him, his responsibility
supersedes that of the contractor. See, e.g., Russell, 100 N.H. at 173, 121 A.2d at 782; Tipton, 67
N.M. at 394, 356 P.2d at 49; Inman v. Binghamton Hous. Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 145, 143
N.E.2d 895, 899, 164 N.Y.S.2d 699, 704 (1957); Leininger, 17 Utah 2d at 43, 404 P.2d at 37. See
also PROSSER, supra note 19, at 681-82.
Some courts do not indicate whether the contractor is liable if the specifications are ob-
viously defective and dangerous. See, e.g., Belk v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 272 F.2d 394 (6th Cir.
1959); Trustees of the First Baptist Church v, McElroy, 223 Miss, 327, 78 So.2d 138 (1955).
Although a negligence action, the First Baptist Church case was decided on warranty principles,
since it was a suit by the employer against the contractor for consequential damages. This factor
may explain why there was no "obviously defective and dangerous" limitation contained in the
court's holding.
31 See, e.g., Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951) (federal
contract); McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980) (state contract);
Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973) (private contract).
32 See text and notes at notes 60-94 infra.
" See text and notes at notes 95-98 infra.
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I. Negligence Cases
It is clear from the cases and commentaries that the contract specification
defense applies in negligence actions against manufacturers selling products
pursuant to private or government contracts." Only a few cases, however,
have been products liability actions against government contractors." Further-
more, none of these products liability cases decided under a negligence theory
involved contracts with the federal government. Nevertheless, several non-prod-
ucts liability cases have established the viability of the contract specification
defense in actions against federal contractors. 36
Although the availability of the contract specification defense is well-
established in negligence actions, the defense is subject to certain limitations
which can present difficult problems in application." The first difficulty con-
cerns the interpretation and application of the exception embodied in the de-
fense for specifications which are "obviously defective and dangerous." The
courts usually state that liability is not imposed unless the specifications are so
glaringly, patently or obviously defective and dangerous that the "ordinary"
contractor or a "competent" contractor would realize they are unsafe and
would decline to follow them." Some courts have expressed the standard in the
alternative terms of what would be sufficiently patent or obvious to a
"reasonably competent technician."" Other courts would impose liability on-
ly when the danger is so obvious that no reasonable person would follow the
specifications." Although these statements of the rule vary in some respects,
their common concern is in not holding the contractor or manufacturer to as
high a standard of accountability as if he himself had drafted the specifications.
Consistent with this concern, it has been suggested that the duty imposed on
contractors who are bound by the specifications of another is somewhat less
than the duty imposed on contractors who have complete control over the work
being performed.'" The courts seem to have recognized that the average con-
tractor does not have the knowledge or expertise to conduct a detailed reevalua-
54 See, e.g., Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973) (defendant had
manufactured product pursuant to private contract); McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594
S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980) (defendant had manufactured product pursuant to state government con-
tract); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS f 404 (1965) (comment adopting contract
specification defense contained in section dealing with liability of makers, rebuilders and
repairers of chattels).
35 See, e.g., Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978); McCabe Powers
Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980).
36 See, e.g., Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951); Ryan v.
Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924).
" Although these difficulties have arisen primarily in negligence cases, they can be ex-
pected to arise as well in those strict liability and breach of warranty actions in which the defense
can be raised.
39
 See text and note at note 21 supra; Linkhale, 268 F. Supp. at 803 n.16.
39
 See, e.g., Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded for misapplication of conflict of laws rules, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
" See, e.g., Leininger, 17 Utah 2d at 41, 404 P.2d at 36.
" Lietkhale, 268 F. Supp. at 803 n.16.
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tion of the specifications. 42 Thus, the "unless obviously defective and
dangerous" limitation to the contract specification defense serves to lessen the
contractor's duty to judge the specifications, and imposes liability only in ex-
treme cases."
One of the few courts to consider the precise manner in which the "unless
obviously defective" limitation is to be applied to a manufacturer which
possesses special skill or expertise in the field was the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co."Judge Learned Hand, while
citing the rule in Ryan approvingly, held that the trial court correctly instructed
the jury that the contractor was liable for defects in the specifications which
would have been obvious to an electrical engineer, since the contractor had
employed an electrical engineer.° With respect to another defendant-
contractor, Judge Hand stated that he was to be held to the standard of an or-
dinary "electrical contractor" rather than an electrical engineer since he had
no engineer in his employ. 46 If this standard were applied to products liability
cases, then, manufacturers would be expected to notice defects in design which
would be patent or obvious to the ordinary prudent manufacturer of such prod-
ucts. In addition, manufacturers might be held to a higher standard of care to
reflect any special knowledge, skill or expertise they possessed beyond that of
other manufacturers in the field. Thus, the contract specification defense, as
applied by Judge Hand,'" approximates the usual prudent man or prudent ex-
pert test, except that instead of asking whether the manufacturer "knew or
should have known" of a defect, the inquiry is whether the defect was or should
have been "obvious" to the manufacturer. Presumably actual knowledge of a
defect by the manufacturer, as in the case of a flaw which the manufacturer
discovers in the specifications, would render the defect "obvious" to that
manufacturer even though it might not be objectively obvious to a reasonably
competent manufacturer.
Even where a defect was or should have been obvious to the contractor,
42 See Ryan, 239 N.Y. at 45-46, 145 N.E. at 321.
" Littlehale, 268 F. Supp. at 803 n.16.
" 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951).
43 Id. at 834-36.
" Id. at 836.
47 Other courts have not discussed the manner in which the "unless obviously defec-
tive" limitation is to be applied as expressly as did Judge Hand in Person. They have looked,
however, at the circumstances of the case to determine one or more of several factors. For exam-
ple, courts have looked to whether the manufacturer/contractor had had much experience with
providing similar products, equipment or services in the past. See, e.g., Davis v. Henderlong
Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Ind. 1962). Courts have also examined whether, con-
sidering the nature of the manufacturer/contractor's contractual role, he was in a position to
know of the dangerous propensities of a product he was furnishing. See, e.g., Leininger v.
Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 41, 404 P.2d 33, 36 (1965). Courts also have examined
whether the manufacturer/contractor had been provided sufficient information about the final
layout of a system or intended use of a product to enable him to know of its dangers in relation to
that use. See, e.g., Davis, 221 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Ind. 1962); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 205
Neb. 292, 300, 287 N.W.2d 430, 434 (1980).
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however, so that he is prevented from raising the contract specification defense,
he may be able to avoid liability in many cases. Courts have held that if the
party who employed the contractor discovered the danger, or if it was obvious
to that party, his responsibility supersedes that of the contractor. 48 Thus, it ap-
pears that for the most part a manufacturer will be liable only when a defect
was or should have been obvious to the manufacturer but was not discovered
by or obvious to the government. Presumably this result could occur where, for
example, the manufacturer had superior knowledge or expertise with respect to
a product, or where a danger or defect which was not apparent from the
specifications became apparent during the manufacturing or testing process.
Another problem in the application of the contract specification defense
arises when the manufacturer is granted some discretion as to the details of the
product's design." At issue is whether this discretion precludes the manufac-
turer from raising the defense. A few courts have stated that in order for the
defense properly to be invoked, the act or omission-which led to the plaintiff's
damage or injury must have been required by the specifications, with no
discretion left to the contractor. 5° This requirement that the contractor have no
discretion in the manner of performing the work seems to follow logically from
the statement in Ryan that the contractor "is justified in relying on the
specifications . . . ." 51
 Where a contractor has discretion in the manner of ac-
complishing the work, so that he could have avoided the damage or injury
without violating the terms of the contract, the contractor really does not rely
on the specifications. Such manufacturer discretion is common in the case of
government contracts. For example, instead of furnishing "design specifica-
tions" to a manufacturer, the government may furnish only "performance
specifications," relying on the manufacturer. to provide the detailed design of
48 See note 30 supra. The shifting of responsibility from the contractor is said to result
from an absence of proximate cause. See PROSSER, supra note 19, at 682. This qualification to the
defense appears itself to be subject to further qualification. The buyer's responsibility may not
supersede that of the manufacturer in particular fact situations, such as where the product is
highly dangerous. See, e.g. , McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Ky. 1980)
(liability may be imposed for open and obvious design defects which are "extraordinarily
dangerous"). See generally PROSSER, supra note 19, at 667-68, 649-50.
49
 Although this problem has arisen primarily in negligence actions, it can be expected
to arise as well in those strict liability and breach of warranty actions in which the contract
specification defense can be raised.
5° See, e.g., Arnold v. Edelman, 375 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Mo. 1964). See also Leininger v.
Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 17 Utah 2d 37, 41, 404 P.2d 33, 36, in which the court stressed that the
defendant "did not design, sell or recommend the installation of such fans, and had no discretion in
their selection . " (emphasis added). Likewise, in Hunt v. Blasius, 55 III. App. 3d 14, 15-18,
370 N.E.2d 617, 618-21 (1977), aff'd, 74 111. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978), the Appellate Court
of Illinois twice mentioned that the specifications provided the contractor in the case before it
were mandatory and then quoted Littlehale v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp.
791, aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967) approvingly: "It is not a case where the manufacturer had
any freedom of choice as to manufacture, design or use of materials. ... [H]ere an independent
contractor having no discretion or control over production and means of manufacture if directed to comply
with the strict contract requirements and specifications contained therein . . . ." Id. at 801-02 &
n.16 (emphasis added).
" See text and note at note 29 supra.
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the product. 52
 In such cases, it would seem inappropriate to allow the contract
specification defense to bar recovery for a flaw in the design, since the rationale
for the defense is not present."
Related to the issue of manufacturer discretion is the question whether a
manufacturer may invoke the contract specification defense when it actually
has participated in the design of the product. 54
 Contracts for the purchase of
52
 Design specifications essentially provide "how to build" detail, whereas perform-
ance specifications prescribe what the government requires as a final product. "Design specifica-
tions state 'precise measurements, tolerances, materials, in-process and finished product tests,
quality control and inspection requirements, and other information.' The Government also may
furnish performance specifications in which are stated the performance characteristics desired for
the item, e.g. , a vehicle to attain a speed of 50 miles per hour." PAUL, supra note 2, at 261.
The distinction between the two types of specifications can be crucial in determining
contractual liabilities between the parties if a dispute should arise due to unforeseen costs or the
unsuitability of the product. If the government furnishes design specifications and the contractor.
follows those specifications literally, the ultimate responsibility for an unsatisfactory product will
be borne by the government. An implied warranty and representation of suitability and ade-
quacy attaches to the plans, specifications and drawings furnished by the government to the con-
tractor. Id. at 262-64. See generally Dygert, Implied Warranties in Government Contracts, 53 MIL. L.
REV. 39 (1971); Patten, The Implied Warranty that Attaches To Government Furnished Design Specifica-
tions, 31 FED B. J. 291 (1972). In a procurement in which the contractor is given options with
respect to how the items are to be produced, however, an implied warranty does not attach.
PAUL, supra note 2, at 262-64. Where an item is purchased by a performance specification, the
contractor accepts general responsibility for design, engineering and achievement of stated per-
formance requirements. He has general discretion and election as to detail, but the work or prod-
uct is subject to the government's reserved right of final inspection, and approval or rejection of
the work or product. Id.
The principles which have evolved in this area of implied warranties concern the con-
tractual liabilities of the parties to the contract, and appear to have developed independently of
tort principles affecting the liability of a contractor/manufacturer to third parties under the con-
tract specification defense. But cf. Trustees of the First Baptist Church v. McElroy, 223 Miss.
327, 78 So. 2d 138 (1955) (implied warranty principles relied on to decide a negligence action be-
tween employer and contractor). There seems to be no case law or commentary involving any at-
tempt by a manufacturer to recover against the government on a breach of implied warranty
theory after the manufacturer successfully has been sued for injuries caused by a defect in design
attributable to government design specifications.
53
 This issue should probably receive greater attention by the courts, since few, if any,
courts have discussed the type of specifications provided and whether there were alternate and
safer means of complying with the specifications. For a related discussion of the effect of
manufacturer discretion on the availability of the government contract defense, see note 146 in-
fra-
" Another related problem concerns the liability of a manufacturer which already has
designed and marketed a product which is available "off the shelf." Rather than issuing design
or performance specifications, the government may issue a "purchase description," specifying
the particular product or its equivalent. See PAUL, supra note 2, at 259-61. If the manufacturer
sells such a product to the government, it is difficult to see why the contract specification defense
should be available in most cases. Although purchase descriptions which call for a particular
product in a sense eliminate the manufacturer's discretion to provide a different product, the
manufacturer probably had discretion initially in the design of the product. The manufacturer,
far from relying on the government's specifications to produce the product, may have induced
the government to rely on the adequacy of the product by marketing it and making its qualities
generally known through advertiSing. The government may not have sufficient familiarity with
the product to be aware of any potential defects or hazards. As a practiCal matter, however, it
would seem that the "unless obviously defective and dangerous" exception would still permit
recovery in many such cases. Assuming the standard would be applied with reference to the
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military aircraft exemplify the kind of cooperative effort between the govern-
ment and a manufacturer which often precedes the government's ultimate
decision on a particular design. The process may begin with an informal sug-
gestion by the government or the manufacturer. The suggestion then may be
followed by design, mock-up, prototype, test work, and final production
models. 55 Compromises often are made between safety features and mission re-
quirements." Throughout this process, the manufacturer is intimately in-
volved with the government in the design and testing of the aircraft." The
question arises whether the contract specification defense should be available in
such circumstances, even where detailed specifications ultimately are provided
to the manufacturer by the government. For the most part, this question has
not been addressed by the courts. 58 Basically two types of cases are likely to
arise, however, only one of which would seem to provide an appropriate oppor-
tunity for raising the defense. In some cases, the government may make a con-
scious design choice and perhaps overrule the manufacturer as to a particular
safety feature. In such cases, a strong argument can be made that the contract
specification defense should be available to the manufacturer, subject to the
"unless obviously defective" limitation. The defense should be available
because the manufacturer has no discretion as to the safety feature. Situations
also might arise, however, where the absence of a safety feature is neither ex-
plicitly mandated by the government in its specifications nor implicitly man-
dated through the government's choice of certain design features which make
special knowledge and expertise of the manufacturer, the manufacturer would find it hard to
argue that it was not in a position to know of certain dangers if it had designed the product. If,
however, the government is aware of the dangers in the product and desires to purchase it
anyway, it may be appropriate to allow the manufacturer to avoid liability in most such cases.
For a discussion of the reasons supporting this conclusion, see text and notes at notes 278-306 in-
" Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
56 Id.
57 Id.
56 In O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), the issue was
touched on briefly. The case was a wrongful death and personal injury action against the
manufacturer of an Air Force B-52 which crashed allegedly as a result of the manufacturer's
negligence in the design and manufacturer of a welded bulkhead. Id. at 1111, 1 I 17. Commenting
on the defendant's claim that the design was the responsibility of the government, the court
stated:
There is no question, and the court so finds, that ultimate responsibility for the
design and use of the B-52 bomber rests and always has rested with the United
States government. The court concludes, however, that this fact, in itself, neither
exonerates the defendant, nor has it in any way altered the defendant's duty as a
manufacturer in this case where there has been no showing that the defendant was
totally oblivious of and/or aloof from the genesis of the design specifications in the
first place or that the specifications represented either something less than the up-
permost level of the art or a compromise of safety.
Id. at 1124. In this passage, the court seems to have suggested that a manufacturer which is in-
volved in the design of a product may not have a contract specification defense available unless
the alleged flaw in design was the result of a conscious choice by the government after balancing
mission and safety considerations. The court did not elaborate on these comments, however, and
consequently their full import remains in doubt.
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the incorporation of the safety feature impractical. Instead, the manufacturer
may have some discretion whether to incorporate the safety feature in the
design of the product. Arguably, the presence of manufacturer discretion
should preclude the successful raising of the contract specification defense."
In summary, the contract specification defense has been successfully
asserted in negligence cases involving a variety of contract situations, including
the manufacture and sale of products to state governments. The defense may
not be raised where a defect in the specifications was or should have been ob-
vious to the manufacturer. Any special knowledge or expertise possessed by the
manufacturer may be a factor in determining if a defect should have been ob-
vious. If the party employing the contractor discovered the defect, or if the
defect was obvious to that party, his responsibility may supersede that of the
manufacturer. The defense should not be successful when the manufacturer
had discretion in the design of the product, and may not be successful where
the manufacturer participated in developing the design.
2. Strict Liability Cases
Courts have disagreed over whether a manufacturer of a product who has
fully complied with a buyer's specifications may invoke the contract specifica-
tion defense in an action brought under a theory of strict liability. An action in
strict liability, unlike an action in negligence, normally does not require a
defect to be caused by the defendant's act or omission; it is only necessary that
the product be defective when it leaves the defendant's control and that the
defect be the cause of the injury. 60 Thus, some courts, particularly in cases in-
volving private contracts, have concluded that the manufacturer's lack of con-
trol over the design of the product should not bar an action in strict liability. 61
59 There is another possible approach to determining whether a manufacturer which
has helped to design a product should bear the responsibility for a flaw in the specifications. In
appropriate cases courts might borrow from precedent dealing with the issue whether an implied
warranty of suitability and adequacy by the government to the contractor has attached to the
specifications. See note 52 supra. For example, where the government has incorporated into a con-
tract detailed specifications recommended by the contractor as more satisfactory than the govern-
ment specifications, recovery by the contractor on the theory of implied warranty has been
denied when the specifications failed to result in a satisfactory product. See generally Dygert, supra
note 52, at 42. By analogy, it could be argued that the contractor has not relied on the specifica-
tions for purposes of invoking the contract specification defense.
60 See text and note at note 9 supra.
61 In cases involving private contracts, the courts seem to be split about evenly on the
queition whether the contract specification defense can defeat an action in strict liability. For ex-
ample, in Lenherr v. NRM Corp., 504 F. Stipp. 165 (D. Kan. 1980), the plaintiff, an employee
of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, had lost his arm when it became caught in a
"squeegee machine" manufactured by NRM. Id. at 167-68. The United States District Court
for the District of Kansas held that NRM could be held strictly liable for the defective design of
the machine, even though NRM had manufactured the machine in accordance with a design
provided by Goodyear. Id. at 175-76. The court rejected the applicability of the contract
specification defense to actions brought under a theory of strict liability. Id. at 174. The court first
noted that most of the cases in which the contract specification defense had been discussed were
negligence actions, and that the defense was logical under negligence principles. Id. The court
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In cases involving government contracts, only a few courts have addressed
the viability of the contract specification defense in a suit brought under a
theory of strict liability. In Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, 62 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, rejected the applicability of the
contract specification defense to a strict liability action." In Challoner, a serv-
iceman was killed and another injured when a howitzer round prematurely ex-
ploded during combat with the North Vietnamese. 64 The plaintiffs, the injured
serviceman and the administrator of the deceased serviceman's estate, sued the
manufacturer of the round on a strict liability theory, 65 and obtained a judg-
ment in their favor. 66
 On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial judge
had erred in instructing the jury that it could find the defendants liable if it
found the howitzer shell was defectively designed." The defendants claimed
then observed that S 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS imposes liability even if a
seller has exercised all possible care, and that retailers are held liable for defects that they have
not caused. Id. The Lenherr court cited two policy reasons for not permitting the contract
specification defense in a strict liability action, terming them the reliance rationale and the loss
spreading rationale. Id. The court stated that the reliance rationale is based on the right of the
public to rely on sellers to stand behind their products and to provide compensation for those who
are injured by their products. Id. The loss spreading rationale, according to the court, recognizes
the devastating burdens visited on a consumer injured by a defective product and therefore shifts
the burden of loss to manufacturers and sellers who can treat the loss as a cost of doing business.
Id. This cost ultimately is passed on to future consumers of the product and the injured person's
loss is borne by society. Id.
Courts which have permitted the contract specification defense in strict liability cases in-
volving private contracts have not thoroughly discussed the policies underlying strict liability. For
example, in Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Cob. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978), the Colorado
Supreine Court rejected the court of appeals' view that a manufacturer may be held strictly liable
for a defectively designed machine even if it designed the machine in accordance with the buyer's
specifications. Id. at 170-71, 583 P.2d at 281-82. The court gave no explanation for its rejection
of the court of appeals' view. The court of appeals had rejected the applicability of the contract
specification defense to a strict liability action on essentially the same grounds as had the Lenherr
court. The appeals court reasoned that S 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes no distinc-
tion between manufacturers, sellers or designers, and that the policies underlying strict liability
apply equally when the manufacturer or seller has not designed the product, since fault is not a
prerequisite to liability under 5 402A. Pust v. Union Supply Co., 38 Cob. App. 435, 440-44, 561
P.2d 355, 359-60 (1976), aff'd, 196 Cob. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978). See also Moon v. Winger
Boss Co., 205 Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430 (1980), where the court based its approval of the
defense in a strict liability action almost entirely on 5 404 of the Restatement and on cases decided
under negligence principles, without commenting on the different policy considerations involved
in suits brought under a theory of strict liability. Id. at 296-97, 287 N.W.2d at 433, (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 404 (1965)). See also Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d
373, 375 n.2 (4th Cir. 1973) (stating without discussion that even though the case was being
decided under negligence principles, the contract specification defense would bar recovery under
a theory of strict liability as well).
62 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for misapplication of conflict of laws rules,
423 U.S. 3 (1975).
63 512 F.2d at 83.
64
 Id. at 78,
63 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 82.
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that the design of the shell was within the exclusive control of the government
and that the contract specification defense precluded the plaintiffs' recovery. 68
In rejecting the applicability of the defense to strict liability cases, the court of
appeals distinguished cases recognizing the contract specification defense as
based on negligence principles. The court stated that "[a] strict liability case,
unlike a negligence case, does not require that the defendant's act or omission
be the cause of the defect. It is only necessary that the product be defective
when it leaves the defendant's control. " 69 In support of this conclusion the
court cited comment f to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,"
which applies strict liability to "wholesalers, retailers, or distributors," even
though these parties normally are not the ones which caused the defect."
The court in Challoner also addressed the defendants' contention that the
normal justifications for imposing strict liability do not apply in the case of a
government contract. The court acknowledged that many of the justifications
for imposing strict liability were not present in such cases. 72 Nevertheless, the
court stressed that one of the primary goals of strict liability is to allocate the
costs of injuries caused by defective products to manufacturers instead of to the
persons injured by the products." This goal is justified because those injured
by defective products are powerless to protect themselves. 74 The court stated
that this policy extends to protecting members of the armed forces as well as the
general public."
In contrast to Challoner, some courts have held that the contract specifica-
tion defense can be successfully invoked in strict liability cases involving
government contracts. For example, in McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp," the
Supreme Court of Kentucky concluded that it would not be logical in most
cases to hold a manufacturer liable for a design defect caused by another
party." In McCabe, the plaintiff, an electrician for the state Department of
" Id.
fig Id. at 83.
70 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A, comment f (1965).
71 Challoner, 512 F.2d at 83.
77 Id. at 84.
" Id.
74 Id.
" Id. It is not clear whether the government contract defense was raised in Challoner, or
whether the court considered it to be equally unavailable in a strict liability action. Other courts
which have considered a manufacturer's liability for design defects in military products have not
adopted the Challoner court's position. Two such cases, Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), Wt. denied, 75
N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978), and Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y. S.2d
400 (Sup. Ct. 1980), are discussed later in section two of this note under the government contract
defense. Both courts produced holdings which more closely resemble the government contract
defense, relying on public policy arguments and several cases involving the government contract
defense. The cases are therefore discussed under the heading of the government contract defense.
See text at notes 171-94 infra.
76 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980).
" Id. at 595.
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Highways, was injured when he fell through the open side of the bucket of an
aerial boom." The plaintiff sued under theories of negligence, strict liability,
and breach of warranty, alleging in essence that the bucket had been defective-
ly designed. 79
 The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the manufacturer."
On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's breach of
warranty claim, but concluded that a jury question was presented as to whether
the aerial boom was unreasonably dangerous when sold by the defendants'
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention that compliance with
the state's specifications was a defense. 82
 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
reversed the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's deci-
sion." The court held that the contract specification defense barred recovery
for a design defect even in a strict liability action. 84
 To the court, it was
dispositive that the manufacturer had constructed the aerial boom in exact ac-
cordance with the specifications provided by the state." The court found
significant its holding in a previous case that the standard of liability for defec-
tive design was essentially the same under theories of strict liability and
negligence." The court also stated that the case presented a different situation
than the typical products liability case, since here the buyer had specified the
product's design." The court reasoned that holding the defendant liable under
these circumstances would be illogical as it would amount to holding a non-
designer liable for a design defect." The court held that since the manufacturer
complied with the buyer's specifications and since the alleged defect was open
and obvious to users, recovery was barred." The court stated, however, that a
" Id. at 593.
79 Id.
°° Id.
81 Id.
" Id. at 594.
" Id. at 595.
84 Id. at 594-95.
85 Id. at 595.
86 Id. at 594. See note 9 supra for a discussion of the similarity between the negligence
and strict liability standards in a defective design action.
87
 McCabe Powers Body Co., 594 S.W.2d at 594.
88 Id. at 595. The court's reliance on authority in this case provides an example of how
courts sometimes fail to distinguish between cases involving the contract specification defense
and the government contract defense. In support of its discussion concerning manufacturer's
compliance with specifications, the court cited Rigsby v. Brighton Eng'g Co., 464 S.W.2d 279
(Ky. 1971), a government contract defense case, and Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373
(4th Cir. 1973), a contract specification defense case. This confusion was harmless in McCabe,
because the manufacturer would have avoided liability under either defense. As a general matter,
however, courts should recognize the differences between the two lines of cases. There are dif-
ferences both in the rationales offered in support of the defenses, and the rules which have been
applied. Perhaps the most significant difference between the defenses is that the government con-
tract defense has been held to absolve a contractor from liability even when the defect in specifica-
tions is obvious. See text and note at note 144 infra.
89
 McCabe Powers Bady Co., 594 S.W.2d at 594-95.
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case might arise where a design defect is so "extraordinarily dangerous" that
the manufacturer should decline to produce the item. 9° The court withheld
judgment as to a concealed defect in design in a product built according to the
buyer's specifications." Thus, the McCabe court appears to have adopted a
slight variation of the contract specification defense, at least in cases where a
defect is an open and obvious one rather than a latent one. The court apparent-
ly would require that a defect be "extraordinarily dangerous" before allowing
recovery. Most courts, however, state that the contract specification defense
permits recovery if the defect merely is "obviously" dangerous. 92
In summary, there is a split of opinion among the courts as to whether the
contract specification defense should be available in a products liability action
brought under a theory of strict liability. The basic rationale for not allowing
the defense is that strict liability does not require that a defect be caused by the
defendant." The rationale for allowing the defense is that the standard of
liability for defective design should be the same whether the action is based on
negligence or strict liability theory, and that it is illogical to hold a party liable
for a design defect which the party has not caused."
9° Id. at 595.
91 Id.
92 See text and note at note 21 supra. The court may have adopted a somewhat more
restrictive standard for recovery because the alleged defect in McCabe was open and obvious to the
user rather than concealed. Some courts bar recovery entirely if the defect is discovered by or ob-
vious to the buyer as well as the manufacturer. See text and note at note 48 supra. For a case from
another jurisdiction which considered issues similar to those addressed by the court in McCabe,
see Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978). In Hunt, two occupants of a car were
killed and three others were seriously injured when the car left the paved portion of a highway
and struck the post of an exit sign. Id. at 206, 384 N.E.2d at 369. The plaintiffs sued the
manufacturer of the sign under negligence and strict liability theories, alleging that the sign had
been defectively designed. Id. at 206, 384 N.E.2d at 370. The manufacturer had built the sign ac-
cording to state specifications. Id. The Appellate Court of Illinois held that strict compliance with
government mandated specifications was a defense to an action in either negligence or strict
liability. Hunt v. Blasius, 55 III. App. 3d 14, 20, 370 N.E.2d 617, 621-23. The court of appeals
did not include, however, the "unless obviously defective and dangerous" exception in its
holding, perhaps implying that compliance with specifications was a complete defense, at least
when a government contract is involved. Id. The court reasoned that government contracts were
different from private undertakings, since imposing liability on government contractors would
adversely affect the cost of government contracts and the willingness of contractors to bid. Id. at
20, 370 N.E.2d at 621. The defense was thus needed to "preserve tax revenues." Id. The
Supreme Court of Illinois in Hunt appears to have modified the holding of the court of appeals.
The supreme court first considered the negligence theory, and indicated that the contract
specification defense barred recovery under that theory. Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 210, 384 N.E.2d at
371. The court, however, recited theft& defense, including the exception for obvious defects and
dangers. Id. The supreme court did not reach the question of whether the defense would be effec-
tive against a strict liability action. Instead, the court held that the plaintiffs had failed to carry
their burden of proving that the sign in fact was defective. Id. at 212, 384 N.E.2d at 372. It can be
presumed, however, from the court's holding with regard to negligence, that under a strict
liability theory a manufacturer would at least be liable if the defect were obvious.
93 See text and notes at notes 68-71 supra.
94 See text and notes at notes 85-88 supra.
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3. Breach of Warranty Cases
There has been virtually no discussion in the cases concerning the applica-
bility of the contract specification defense to a breach of warranty action. In
Spangler v. Kranco, Inc.," which involved a private contract, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law, allowed the
contract specification defense to bar recovery under a negligence theory. 96 The
court stated in a footnote that although the suit was brought under a negligence
theory, the result would have been the same under a breach of warranty
theory. 97 The only reason given by the court to support this statement was that
in a previous decision it had held that the standard of safety imposed on a
manufacturer is "essentially the same" whether the theory of liability was
labeled warranty, negligence or strict liability."
The foregoing discussion has analyzed the applicability of the contract
specification defense to products liability actions brought against federal con-
tractors under three theories of liability for defects in product design:
negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. The next section will
analyze the relationship of the contract specification defense to a cause of action
based not on a defect in design, but on an inadequate warning of a product's
defects or dangers.
4. Inadequate Warning
The duty to warn of dangers or defects associated with a product frequent-
ly provides an alternative basis of recovery in many "typical" products liability
cases even where the product has not been defectively designed or manufac-
" 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
96 Id. at 375.
97 Id. at 375 n.2.
98 Id. See notes 9 and 14 supra for a comparison of the three theories of recovery. Those
courts which distinguish the theories of recovery presumably would not assume that the contract
specification defense, which arose in cases decided under negligence principles, necessarily is ap-
plicable in an action based on breach of warranty. An action for breach of warranty normally re-
quires application of the U.C.C. provisions. See text and notes at notes 10 and 22 supra. Applica-
tion of the warranty provisions of the U.C.C., however, sometimes may achieve a result similar
to that achieved by applying the contract specification defense. Implied warranties under the
U.C.C. may arise pursuant to 55 2-314 and 2-315. Sections 2-314 and 2-315 create implied war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, and 5 2-316 deals with their exclu-
sion or modification. U.C.C. 55 2-314, 2-315, 2-316. Comment 9 to 5 2-316 states that a seller's
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose normally does not arise where the buyer gives
precise and complete specifications to the seller, since in such instances, the buyer does not rely
on the seller to develop a product which suits the particular purpose. U.C.C. S 2-316 comment 9.
As for the implied warranty of merchantability, comment 9 to 5 2-316 refers to 5 2-317 which
provides that an express warranty displaces such an implied warranty of merchantability if the
two warranties are inconsistent. Id. U.C.C. 5 2-317. Thus, comment 9 suggests that if the
buyer's specifications are faulty, a seller's express warranty that the product will comply with the
buyer's specifications displaces any implied warranty of merchantability which might otherwise
exist. This result occurs because an implied warranty that the product will be merchantable is in-
consistent with an express warranty that it also will comply with the faulty specifications.
Therefore, the seller is not liable to the buyer for breach of warranty under the U.C.C. if the
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tured. 99
 Thus, the issue arises whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn
foreseeable users of its product even when the contract specification defense
bars recovery for a design defect. One issue is whether it is appropriate to allow
the contract specification defense to bar recovery for a design defect because the
design was not "obviously defective and dangerous," but to hold the manufac-
turer to the usual standard for determining whether it should have issued a
warning. The usual standard imposes liability for failure to warn if the
manufacturer "knew or should have known" of a given product's dangers,
without requiring that the dangers be obvious to the manufacturer.'" Thus,
applying the usual standard theoretically could allow plaintiffs to bypass the
contract specification defense by providing a lower threshold of proof in an ac-
tion for inadequate warning than in an action for a design defect.
An alternative approach which avoids the potential bypassing of the con-
tract specification defense is to make the standard for determining if there is a
duty to warn comparable to the standard for determining if a design is "ob-
viously defective and dangerous" for purposes of avoiding the contract
specification defense. Under this approach, the failure to warn would con-
stitute an alternative grounds for suit only where the dangers associated with
the product or design were so glaring, patent or obvious, that a competent
manufacturer would have issued a warning (but where there may or may not
have been a defect in design). Under this approach, plaintiffs suing either for a
product is defective due to the buyer's specifications. See, e.g., Mohasco Indus., Inc. v. Anderson
Halverson Corp., 90 Nev. 114, 520 P.2d 234 (1974). In Mohasco Indus., the foregoing analysis
was applied to bar the buyer of a carpet from recovering from the manufacturer on theories of
breach of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability where the manufacturer had fully
complied with the buyer's specifications. Id. at 116, 119, 520 P.2d at 234-36.
Although it seems clear that a buyer who provides detailed specifications has no cause of
action against a seller for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness, there is still
the question of possible liability of the seller to third parties injured as a result of the defective
specifications. In other words, can an implied warranty of merchantability or fitness run to an in-
jured third party even though no such implied warranty runs to the buyer? This issue, in the con-
text presently being discussed, does not appear to have been ruled on definitively. A similar
issue, however, pertaining to the effect of disclaimers of warranties, has been the subject of con-
siderable discussion by U.C.C. commentators. See generally 2A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note
8, 19.07[6]. The issue is whether a disclaimer made by the seller to a buyer should bar actions
by third parties. Id. Particular problems have arisen in trying to reconcile U.C.C. 5 2-316, which
allows disclaimers, with 5 2-719(3), which makes limitations on consequential damages for per-
sonal injuries prima facie unconscionable. See 2A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, 5
19.07[6]. It has been suggested that an attempt totally to disclaim warranties would be uncon-
scionable in the case of personal injuries. Id. Be that as it may, it is submitted that there is a
qualitative difference between a disclaimer and the situation in which a manufacturer has fully
complied with a buyer's detailed specifications. In the case of the disclaimer, the manufacturer is
seeking to limit a liability which normally would attach. In the situation where the manufacturer
complies with a buyer's specifications it is not seeking to limit its liability. Rather, no warranty
normally would arise at all, because any implied warranties would be displaced automatically by
the manufacturer's express warranty to conform to the specifications. In any event, it appears
that the final resolution of this issue must await further rulings by the courts on the relevant
U.C.C. provisions.
99 See text and notes at notes 15-16 supra.
1 " See text and note at note 19 supra.
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defect in design or for a failure to warn would have a similar burden of
establishing that the defect in the specifications or the danger associated with
the product was or should have been obvious to the defendant manufacturer. 1 ° 1
Definitive answers to these questions have not been provided by the
courts, as issues pertaining to the existence and precise scope of a duty to warn
have not commonly arisen in cases discussing the contract specification
defense. There is some indication in the area of private contracts, however,
that the usual standard for determining a duty to warn may apply without the
requirement that the danger be "obvious. '"° 2
 In cases involving government
contracts, however, there is some indication that the standard for imposing
liability for a failure to warn may be similar to the standard for imposing liabili-
ty for a design defect under the contract specification defense. For example, in
McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 10' a case involving a state government con-
tract, the Supreme Court of Kentucky stated that although there was no duty
to warn in that particular case because the manufacturer had followed the
buyer's specifications and because the danger was known and obvious to the
user, there might be situations where the "plans and specifications furnished
by a buyer could contain design defects so extraordinarily dangerous that a
product manufacturer should decline to produce or, if appropriate, issue warn-
ings . . . . "4
 Thus, the court appeared to equate the standard for determin-
ing a duty to warn with the standard embodied in the contract specification
defense for determining when the manufacturer is liable for a defect in
1 °' Another question is whether a manufacturer, by fulfilling its duty to warn, thereby
absolves itself from any further liability for manufacturing a defectively designed product. At
issue is whether the "unless obviously defective and dangerous" exception to the contract
specification defense still might require a manufacturer to refrain from building a product, if the
design defect were too dangerous to be adequately remedied by a warning.
102 See, e.g., Crane v. Scars Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754
(1963). In Crane, the plaintiff was injured when a can of surface preparer ignited. Id. at 857-58,
32 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56. She sued both the manufacturer (Universal) and seller (Sears) for breach
-of warranty and for negligent failure adequately to warn of the product's dangerous propensities.
Id. Universal interposed the defense that the surface preparer was not its product but the formula
of Sears. Id. at 858-59, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 756. Universal claimed that Sears gave Universal the for-
mula to mix the ingredients and place in a can with a label on the outside conforming to one
prepared by Sears. Id. The court held:
One who manufactures a dangerous product cannot claim exemption from liabili-
ty for injuries from the use of such product on the ground of merely carrying out
the express orders of a third party with respect to its manufacture and labeling
where the label does not give appropriate warning to the purchasing public . .. .
In view of the latent, dangerous qualities of the surface preparer herein involved,
Universal, as manufacturer, had an independent duty of determining that ade-
quate warning was given to the public with respect to its use.
Id. at 859, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 756. As for the standard to be used to determine whether the
manufacturer had satisfied its "independent duty" to warn, the court held that the ordinary
standard applied: "A manufacturer or supplier of a product must give warning of any dangerous
propensity of an article produced or sold by him inherent in the product or in its use of which he
knows or should know, and which the user of the product would not ordinarily discover." Id, at 860,
32 Cal. Rptr. at 757 (emphasis added).
103
 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980).
104 Id. at 595.
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design.'°5 Under this formulation, liability for failure to warn would only , be
imposed where the product would be extraordinarily dangerous absent a warn-
ing. 105
It is helpful at this point to summarize the current status of the contract
specification defense in products liability actions involving defective products
sold to the federal government. The contract specification defense has been
raised effectively in a considerable number of negligence actions of various
types, including products liability actions. 147 The defendants in these cases
have included contractors performing contracts for federal and state govern-
ments and private parties.'" Only a few cases, however, have been products
liability actions involving government contracts. Furthermore, none of these
products liability cases decided under negligence theory involved contracts
'° A literal reading of the McCabe court's above quoted statement might lead to the con-
clusion that an action for failure to warn can only exist when the specifications contain a design
defect. Yet, under traditional duty to warn principles, a duty to warn may exist where there is no
design defect, but where the failure to warn would be unreasonably dangerous because of a prod-
uct's propensities. See text and note at note 16 supra. It does not appear that the court intended to
depart from traditional duty to warn principles, however, in view of its reliance on comment j to
S 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS as authority for its result in McCabe. McCabe,
594 S.W.2d at 594. Comments h and j of the Restatement suggest that a product may become
defective merely through the absence of a warning. The court simply may not have focused on
the duty to warn issue and consequently may have failed to describe adequately the cir-
cumstances in which the duty to warn might exist.
1 ° 6 A similar position was expressed by the court in Littlehale v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). In Lit-
tlehale, the plaintiffs, a civilian employee and a Navy seaman serving on a naval vessel, were in-
jured when some detonators (blasting caps) prematurely exploded. Id. at 793. They sued the
manufacturer alleging that the warnings printed on the boxes containing the blasting caps were
inadequate. Id. at 796. The defendant had fully complied with the government's specifications
and there was no claim of defective manufacture or design. Id. at 795. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the defendants did not have a duty to
warn. Id. at 803-04. It based this holding on the principle that ordinarily there is no duty to warn
members of a profession against known risks. Id. at 798. In Littlehale, the Ordnance Department,
to whom the blasting caps were sold, was an expert in the use, handling and storage of such
blasting caps. Id. at 795. The court held that where there is no duty to warn a purchaser who is
well aware of the inherent dangers of the product, there is no duty to warn the employees of that
purchaser. Id. at 799. The court also held that the particular use made of the product was not
foreseeable to the manufacturer. Id. at 803.
Although the court held that there was no duty to warn under the facts of the case, the
court did acknowledge that there generally is a duty to adequately warn a foreseeable purchaser
or user of a product of foreseeable and latent dangers in such products. Id. at 798. The court did
not reach the issue of whether the contract specification defense would preclude a duty to warn,
since it held that there was no duty to warn, anyway. The court did imply, however, that com-
pliance with contract specifications pertaining to the type of warnings to be provided might not
completely eliminate the manufacturer's duty to provide adequate warnings. The court implied
that the manufacturer might have a duty to provide additional warnings when the following of
plans which did not provide for an adequate warning would be a "glaringly dangerous act." Id.
at 803 n.16.
It is not clear from either the McCabe or Littlehale opinions whether there are cases in
which a manufacturer cannot avoid liability for a design defect by issuing warnings, but must
decline to produce in view of the particular danger involved.
107 See text and note at note 34 supra.
108 See text and note at note 31 supra.
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with the federal government. Thus, no court has directly held that the contract
specification defense can be invoked by a federal contractor in a products
liability action. In two cases, however, Hunt v. Blasius'°° and McCabe Powers
Body Co. v. Sharp,"° courts have indicated that the defense is available against
negligence actions for defectively designed products manufactured pursuant to
state government specifications."' Although the Hunt and McCabe cases in-
volved state contracts, they should have precedential value for negligence cases
involving federal contracts as well. The recognition of the contract specification
defense by the Hunt and McCabe courts in products liability cases involving
state contracts, together with the general recognition of the defense by other
courts in non-products liability cases involving federal contracts, suggests that
the defense would be applicable in products liability cases involving federal
contracts brought under a negligence theory.
Although the contract specification defense generally has been available in
negligence actions, there is a split of authority as to whether the defense is
available in an action brought under strict liability theory. One view is that the
defense can be invoked in a strict liability action, since the standard of liability
for a manufacturer should be the same whether the action is grounded in
negligence or strict liability." 2 The other view is that the contract specification
defense cannot defeat an action in strict liability, since recovery in a strict
liability action does not require that the defendant's act or omission be the
cause of the defect."'
With respect to breach of warranty theory, it still is an open question
whether the contract specification defense applies in cases involving govern-
ment contracts." In Spangler v. Kranco, Inc. ," a case involving a private con-
tract, the court indicated that the defense would apply. 16 As for actions based
on inadequate warning, there does appear to be a duty to warn in spite of the
contract specification defense, but only of obvious or extraordinary dangers."'
B. The Government Contract Defense
A separate but interrelated defense" which applies only to actions against
government contractors has evolved along with the contract specification
defense. This defense is referred to in this note as the government contract
defense. This defense is related to the contract specification defense in that it
IG9 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978).
10 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980).
"I Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 210, 384 N.E.2d at 371; McCabe, 594 S.W.2d at 594-95.
"2 See text and notes at notes 76-92 supra.
113 See text and notes at notes 62-75 supra.
" 4 See text and notes at notes 95-98 supra.
15 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973).
116 Spangler, 481 F.2d at 375 n.2. See text and notes at notes 95-98 supra.
1 " See text and notes at notes 100-06 supra.
"8 See text and notes at notes 20-26 supra for a discussion of the interrelation between
the two defenses.
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protects a contractor from liability when he has carried out the government's
wishes by following the specifications in the contract.'" Unlike the contract
specification defense, however, the government contract defense is not based
on principles of negligence or strict liability. Instead, the defense allows the
contractor to "share" the government's immunity from suit' 2° on grounds of
public policy."' Furthermore, the government contract defense, unlike the
contract specification defense, may bar recovery even if the contract specifica-
tions are obviously defective or dangerous.' 22 Thus, the government contract
defense may be a more complete defense to actions against government con-
tractors than the contract specification defense.
Traditionally, the government contract defense was applied only to ac-
tions against government contractors performing public works projects such as
highway, sewer and bridge construction, dredging of rivers, and similar public
improvements.'" Recently, however, several courts have relied on these cases
to bar recovery in products liability actions involving military products.'"
These recent extensions of the government contract defense may threaten to
render the contract specification defense superfluous in cases involving govern-
ment contracts. In order to determine the proper limits of the government con-
tract defense, the origins and underpinnings of that defense will be examined.
Then, the recent extensions of the defense into products liability cases involv-
ing military products will be discussed.
1. Public Works Cases
Although a body of state case law concerning public contractor tort im-
munity had existed since at least the early 1900's, 126 Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Con-
struction Co. , 126 decided in 1940, appears to be the only case in which the
Supreme Court recognized a form of immunity for federal contractors. In
Yearsley, the plaintiff sought to recover for erosion of his waterfront property.
The erosion allegedly had been caused by the construction of dikes by the
defendant pursuant to a contract with the United States Government.'" The
plaintiff argued that the erosion had constituted a taking of property for which
119 Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir.
1961).
1 " See text and note at note 136 infra.
11 ' See text and notes at notes 137-42 infra.
122 See text and note at note 144 infra.
123 See, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (dike construction);
Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963) (road construction); O'Grady v. City of
Montpelier, 474 F.Supp. 186 (D. Vt. 1979) (road construction); Green v. ICI America, Inc.,
n62 F.Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (operation of TNT plant); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v.
United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965) (river dredging); see also cases cited in Annot.,
9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966).
124 See text and notes at notes 171-228 infra.
123 See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966).
126 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
127 Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 19.
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he was entitled to just compensation under the fifth amendment.'" The Court
held that the contractor was not liable to the plaintiff, reasoning that the con-
tractor had been in the position of an agent or officer of the government.'" Ac-
cording to the Court, if the defendant had been authorized to carry out the
project and had not exceeded his authority, he was not liable. 130
 Although the
Court never expressly mentioned the term immunity, it appears that by refer-
ring to the contractor as an agent or officer of the government,'" the Court was
alluding to principles of immunity applied to persons who are sued in their in-
dividual capacity as agents or officers of the government. 132
128 Id. at 19-20.
129 Id. at 20-21. The court's characterization of the contractor as an agent is somewhat
ambiguous. The Court made the following statement:
It is clear that if this authority to carry out the project was validly conferred .. .
there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing [the Government's]
will. . . Where an agent or officer of the Government purporting to act on its
behalf has been held to be liable for his conduct causing injury to another, the
ground of liability has been found to be either that he exceeded his authority or
that it was not validly conferred.
Id. It is not clear from this statement whether the Court was saying that all contractors with the
government are agents of the government, or that because this particular contractor was in fact
an agent of the government, it was shielded from liability. Still another interpretation seems
possible. The Court simply may have been analogizing the position of a government contractor
to that of a government agent or officer, in order to support its conclusion that the contractor
should be shielded from liability. Lower courts have construed Yearsley broadly. Most of the
courts have allowed the government contract defense to be raised by public works contractors
without inquiring into whether any formal agency relationship existed between the contractor
and the government. See, e.g. , Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963); O'Grady v.
City of Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186 (D. Vt. 1979); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States,
243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
13° Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21.
' 3 ' Id.
1 " In Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1942), the Court cited Yearsley for the
following proposition: "It is, of course, true that government contractors obtain certain immuni-
ty in connection with work which they do pursuant to their contractual undertaking with the
United States." Id. at 583. For a discussion of tort immunity for public officers and agents, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 895A, comment c and § 895D (1965), H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1410-23 (2d ed. 1973). It has
been suggested that the issue whether a contractor shares the immunity of the federal government
is a federal question. See Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App.2d 774, 787 n.5, 56
Cal. Rptr. 128, 139 n.6 (1967). Although the Supreme Court in Yearsley did not explicitly state
that the immunity of a federal contractor is to be governed by federal common law, it relied on
federal precedent as authority for its holding that the contractor was not liable. See Yearsley, 309
U.S. at 20-21. In Yearsley, however, the plaintiff's cause of action itself was grounded on a federal
claim. See text and note at note 128 supra. Furthermore, the Court characterized the contractor in
Yearsley as an agent of the federal government. See text and note at note 129 supra. By so
characterizing the contractor, the Court could readily apply federal precedent concerning the im-
munity of government agents and officers. Thus, the Court did not make clear whether federal
precedent would control in cases in which state law claims are brought against independent contrac-
tors with the federal government. Cases subsequent to Yearsley have not explicitly addressed
whether federal common law or state law controls in determining the scope of the government
contract defense in actions brought against federal contractors. In cases in which the plaintiff's
cause of action was based on a federal claim, courts have followed Yearsley and other federal
precedent. See, e.g., Meyers, 323 F.2d at 583; O'Grady, 474 F. Supp. at 187-88. In cases in which
the cause of action was based on state law, however, courts have seemed disposed to follow state
precedent. See, e.g., Merritt, 295 F.2d at 16; Green, 362 F. Supp. at 1264-65.
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Since Yearsley, a long line of cases has recognized the government contract
defense in public works cases involving federal and state contractors. 133 The
defense provides that one who contracts with a public body for the performance
of public work is not liable for damages resulting incidentally or necessarily
from the performance of the contract, although he will be liable if the damage
results from the negligent manner in which the work is completed." 4 Thus, if a
contractor complies with the government's plans and specifications and if the
act or failure to act which causes an injury results from some inadequacy in the
specifications rather than from the negligent manner of doing the work, the
government contract defense protects the contractor from liability.'" In this
respect, courts frequently characterize the government contract defense as a
"sharing" of the government's immunity by the contractor.'"
Various rationales have been offered to support the defense. In Yearsley,
the Court implied that it was improper to look to the contractor for payment,
since he merely was carrying out his duty as an agent or officer of the govern-
ment .' 37 Some courts have reasoned that if the contractor were not provided
with immunity, nuisance actions effectively could tie the government's
hands.'" Other courts have reasoned that refusing to allow the contractor to
1 " See, e.g., Meyers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963); Merritt, Chap-
man & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961); O'Grady v. City of
Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186, 187 (D. Vt. 1979); Green v. ICI America, Inc., 362 F. Supp.
1263, 1265 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc., v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827
(D. Conn. 1965); see also cases cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966). Although the annotation
includes the Ryan case, the author, for reasons already discussed, feels that Ryan represents
another line of cases involving the contract specification defense. See text and notes at notes 27-30
supra.
134 Green, 362 F. Supp. at 1265.
133 Merit, Chapman & Scott Corp., 295 F.2d at 16.
"6 E.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 792 (E.D.N.Y.
1980). Since the government contract defense frequently is characterized as a sharing of the
government's immunity, it has been suggested that the contractor's immunity may exist only
when the government itself is immune. See, e.g., Green, 362 F. Supp. at 1266-67; Littlehale, 268 F.
Supp. at 803 n.17; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382, 385 (1966). It is not clear that the government con-
tract defense is so restricted, however. In Yearsley and other cases, courts have implied that the
government might be liable when the contractor is not. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21-22. See Jemison v.
The Duplex, 163 F. Supp. 947, 949-51 (S.D. Ala. 1958). This result seems consistent with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OE TORTS 5 895D, comment j (1965) which states:
As a general rule, the immunity of a public officer is coterminous with that of his
government. But this is not necessarily true . . . . [D]uties or obligations may be
placed on the government that are not imposed on the officer and statutes
sometimes make the government liable when its employees are immune.
Furthermore, some courts seem to characterize the government contract defense as a defense
rather than an immunity, which suggests that it may be available regardless of the government's
immunity. See, e.g., Merritt, 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961). Other courts have characterized the
defense more as a privilege, reasoning that technically a contractor is not entitled to a govern-
ment's immunity. See Valley Forge Gardens, Inc. v. James F. Morissey, Inc., 385 Pa. 477,
483-84, 123 A.2d 888, 891 (1956). Regardless of whether the defense is characterized as a
defense, immunity or privilege, the effect is essentially the same, in that it allows a contractor to
avoid liability for acts performed pursuant to a government contract.
' 17 Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 21-22. The Court expected that if the damage to the plaintiff's
property actually constituted a taking of property under the fifth amendment, the government
would compensate the plaintiff. Id.
138 See, e.g., Green, 362 F. Supp. at 1265-66, where the court, quoting from Chattanooga
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share in the government's immunity would undermine the "discretionary
function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 139
 For example, it has
been suggested that if contractors were held liable, they would increase their
prices to cover the risk of loss from possible damage actions.'" The cause of
this risk, however, would be compliance with the decisions of executive officers
authorized to make policy judgments."' This arrangement is said to be un-
satisfactory because the government would be paying, through higher contract
prices, for claims which the "discretionary function" exception was designed
to avoid .' 42
Certain aspects of the government contract defense need to be emphasized
in order to comprehend its scope and limitations. First, although there is
authority to the contrary, 143
 there is some indication in cases involving state
contractors that the defense may be effective even if the government's specifica-
tions were obviously defective and dangerous. 144
 In contrast, the contract
& Tenn. River Power Co. v. Lawson, 139 Tenn. 354, 373, 201 S.W. 165, 169 (1917), stated that
private corporations engaged in works of internal improvement must be insulated from nuisance
actions. The court reasoned that the government has the right to erect public improvements and
therefore has the right to employ servants who will be free from suit where they act strictly in the
line of their employment. Id. The court stated that if the rule were to the contrary, it would be
impossible for the United States to serve the public by the erection of great works of internal im-
provement for the benefit of all. Id.
19 See, e.g., Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn.
1965). See note 1 supra, for an explanation of the "discretionary function" exception of the
FTC A.
"° Dolphin Gardens, 243 F. Supp. at 827.
'" Id.
142 Id.
143 Ste, e.g., Lydecker v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 91 N.J.L. 622, 626, 103 A. 251,
253 (1918); Hamilton v. Harkins, 146 Cal. App.2d 566, 573-74, 304 P.2d 82, 87-88 (1956).
"4 E.g., Engler v. Aldridge, 147 Kan. 43, 45-48, 75 P.2d 290, 292-93 (1938). In Engler,
this issue was specifically raised. The plaintiff alleged that plans and specifications provided to a
contractor for highway improvements were so fundamentally defective and so obviously unsound
from an engineering standpoint that an ordinary prudent man could have foreseen that the plans
and specifications would cause unnecessary damage to the plaintiff's land. Id. at 45, 75 P.2d at
292. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the contractor was entitled to share
the immunity of the state. Id. at 48, 75 P.2d at 293. The court reasoned that the contractor was
obligated by his contract and bound to perform according to the plans and specifications fur-
nished by the state. Id. at 46, 75 P.2d at 292. The contractor could neither change the plans nor
quit the work, even though he believed the improvement as projected was bad from an engineer-
ing standpoint. Id. The court also based its holding in part on the principle that an independent
contractor is not liable to a third person for injuries which occur after the work has been com-
pleted and accepted by the contractor. Id. at 47, 75 P.2d at 293. In a subsequent case, Talley v.
Skelly Oil Co., 199 Kan. 767, 433 P.2d 425 (1967), the Supreme Court of Kansas disapproved of
Engler to the extent that it had relied on the rationale pertaining to completed and accepted work.
Talky, 199 Kan. at 776-78, 433 P.2d at 432-34. The court, however, left intact its holding in
Engler, pointing out that there were other grounds for the holding. Talky, 199 Kan. at 778, 433
P.2d at 434. See also Barnthouse v. California Steel Bldgs. Co., 215 Cal. App.2d 72, 76-78, 29
Cal. Rptr. 835, 838 (1963) (concurring opinion interpreted majority holding to be that compli-
ance with specifications was a complete defense; concurring judge would have allowed jury to
consider whether the specifications were obviously defective and dangerous); Sherman v. Miller
Constr. Co., 90 Ind. App. 462, 465, 467, 158 N.E. 255, 256 (1927) (plaintiff had no cause of ac-
tion against defendant contractor even though complaint alleged that defendant knew that con-
struction of school entryway in accordance with plans would constitute a menace and danger).
Although few cases have expressly stated that a contractor is protected even if the
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specification defense permits recovery when the specifications are obviously
defective and dangerous. "5
 Second, the defense is available only when the act
which caused the damage was compelled by the contract. The defense is not
available when the act which caused the damage was subject to the discretion of
the contractor.' 46
 The contract specification defense has the similar require-
ment that the act' or omission complained of must be mandated by the
specifications and not be subject to the discretion of the contractor."' Third,
many courts have held that the government contract defense does not shield a
contractor from liability when the contract requires him to engage in
specifications are obviously dangerous, a close reading of the cases suggests this conclusion. See
cases cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966). In the first place, the overwhelming majority of
courts fail to append any "unless obviously dangerous" exception onto their statement of the
defense. E.g., Green v. ICI America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1265-66 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). It is
doubtful that the failure to do so has been inadvertent or has resulted merely from a desire not to
address the issue unless it is raised. Second, many of the public works cases involved inverse con-
demnation actions in which contractors were acting pursuant to contracts with public bodies
authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. E.g., O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 474
F. Supp. 186, 187 (D. Vt. 1979). If the defense failed whenever the likelihood of damage to prop-
erty was "obvious," the defense would have had little usefulness to such contractors. Large scale
public works projects almost inevitably involve personal property damage. See note 138 supra.
'" See text and note at note 21, supra.
146
	 e.g., Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16
(9th Cir. 1961). In Merritt, the court said:
We find nothing in the record either by way of terms of the contract, or even 'in
the context of surrounding circumstances,' to convince us that the appellants were
required by any government directive or authority to do that which was charged
against them as negligent acts. . . It is elementary that [government] compulsion
must exist before the 'government contract defense' is available.
Id.
The requirement of compulsion may be a difficult standard to apply in a case where a
plaintiff bases his claim not on some act of the defendant done pursuant to the contract, but on a
claimed omission not specifically required by the contract. The question in this case is whether a
contractor, given a fairly complete set of specifications, is responsible for providing safeguards
absent from the specifications. At least one court appears to have answered this question in the
negative. In Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965) the
court held that:
The question of foreseeability of harm and the possible need to protect against it
arose when the Government framed its terms. There is no charge that what the
contractor did was not what it was required to do. Rather, it is that it was negligent
in failing to provide some safeguard against the subsequent escape of the fumes.
Yet, as stated above, this was a decision which rested with the Government. The
Government did not provide for such additional precautions in the plans, and the
Western Contracting Corp. is not to be held liable for this omission.
Id. at 827. On closer examination, however, it is not clear that the court intended that contractors
could escape liability for allegedly negligent omissions more easily than for allegedly negligent
acts not explicitly required by the relevant specifications. Earlier in the opinion, the court found
that the government's failure to specify precautions was the result of the government's exercise of
a discretionary function. Id. Thus, the ability of a contractor to escape liability for the omission of
a safeguard may turn on whether the omission was the result of an affirmative decision by the
government not to require the safeguard. It would seem, therefore, that in cases involving
claimed omissions, courts may have to determine whether the government's specifications were
intended to be all-inclusive. In making this determination, it may be useful to ascertain whether
the government provided the contractor design specifications or performance specifications. See
text and note at note 52 supra for a discussion of design versus performance specifications.
"7
 See text and notes at notes 49-59 supra.
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"ultrahazardous" or "inherently dangerous" activity.'" The position of the
courts in many of these cases arguably can be reconciled with the principles of
the government contract defense on the grounds that there was no specific
direction by the government as to the manner and place in which the activity
was to be conducted.'" Some courts, however, have laid down a broad rule,
rejecting the defense in cases involving ultrahazardous activities even when the
government has provided specific directions."°
Thus, the essential difference between the government contract defense
and the contract specification defense is that the government contract defense
may be broader, possibly barring recovery even where government specifica-
tions are obviously defective or dangerous."' Until recently, however, the
government contract defense does not appear to have been recognized in prod-
ucts liability actions. Rather, the defense had been raised exclusively in cases
involving public works projects.'" Typically, the defense has been successful
against claims of inverse condemnation,' 53 nuisance,'" trespass,'" and
negligent destruction of property.'" In public works cases involving personal
injury claims, however, the government contract defense generally has not
been successful."' Where contractors have sought to avoid liability for per-
sonal injuries by raising the defense of shared immunity, courts usually have
found that the contractor was negligent in the performance of actions not
specifically required by the contract.'" Occasionally, courts have strained to
' 46 See, e.g., Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429,
436-37, 194 N.W.2d 767, 772 (1971), and cases cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382, 402-09 (1966).
But see Pumphrey v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 250 Iowa 559, 567-71, 94 N.W.2d 737, 741-43
(1959).
149 See Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396, 417-18, 181 A.2d 487, 497-98 (1962).
159 See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App.2d 774, 790-91, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 128, 140-41 (1967); Ellison v. Wood & Bush Co., 170 S.E.2d 321, 325 (W. Va. 1969);
Lowry Hill Properties, Inc. v. Ashbach Constr. Co., 291 Minn. 429, 434-37, 194 N.W.2d 767,
771-72 (1971). In Lowry, it appears that the court could have narrowed its decision by holding
that the contractor in that case had discretion to use alternative and safer means to accomplish the
construction. Instead, the court flatly held that the immunity defense is not available in the case
of ultrahazardous activities. Id. at 436-37, 194 N.W.2d at 772.
"' See text and notes at notes 143-44 supra.
'" See text and note at note 123 supra.
153 See, e.g. , O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186 (D. Vt. 1979).
"4 See, e.g., Green v. ICI America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
15 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963).
16 See, e.g., Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14 (9th
Cir. 1961).
157 See, e.g., Dick v. Scott Constr. Co., 539 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Mo. App. 1973); Best v.
Fred Weber Constr. Co., 525 S.W.2d 102, 108 (Mo. App. 1975); Transcon Lines v. Cornell
Constr. Co., 539 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Okla. 1975); Toler v. Hawkins, 188 Okla. 58, 105 P.2d 1041,
1042-43 (1940); Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 794 (Tex. 1962); Clifton v. Struck Constr.
Co., 2 Ohio Op. 142, 144 (C.P. 1935). See cases cited in Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966). But see
Sherman v. Miller Constr. Co., 90 Ind. App. 462, 467, 158 N.E. 255, 256 (1927); Cobb v. Wad-
dington, 154 N.J. Super. 11, 18-19, 380 A.2d 1145, 1148-49 (1977), cert. denied, 76 N.J. 235, 386
A.2d 859 (1978).
use See, e.g., Dick, 539 S.W.2d at 692; Best, 525 S.W.2d at 108; Transom Lines, 539 P.2d
at 1376; Straka:, 360 S.W.2d at 794.
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reach this result.' 59
 Thus, in view of the history of the government contract
defense, it is clear that the defense traditionally has not been associated with
products liability case law. In several recent products liability cases, however,
courts have relied on the government contract defense to bar recovery for
design defects. These recent cases will be examined in order to determine the
reasons cited by the courts for extending the government contract defense to
products liability cases.
2. Recent Cases: Defectively Designed Military Products
In several recent cases, the government contract defense has been raised
in an effort to defeat products liability actions. Coincidentally, all these cases
have involved the sale of military equipment or materials to the government,
and all the plaintiffs in these cases have grounded their suits on a theory of
strict liability. 160 Although there has been some ambiguity in the courts'
holdings, most courts have held that the defense successfully can be invoked in
such cases.
Foster u. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 16 ' appears to be the first case to have ad-
dressed the applicability of the government contract defense to a products
liability action brought against a federal contractor. 152 In Foster, the plaintiff
15 See, e.g., Bess, 525 S.W.2d 102, 108 (Mo. App. 1975). In Best, the plaintiff, who had
been injured when the driver of the car in which she was riding did not see a sharp curve at the
top of a highway ramp, sued the contractor who constructed the ramp because no warning signs
were visible. Id. at 105. The contractor tried to introduce evidence that the ramp had been con-
structed in compliance with specifications of the State Highway Department and that a state
engineer had supervised all work, including the number and location of warning devices and had
ordered the defendant to open the ramp before subcontractors installed guardrails and perma-
nent signs. Id. at 107. the Missouri Court of Appeals, however, held that the evidence was prop-
erly excluded. Id. at 108. The court stated that the defendant was merely trying to shift onto the
state a "non-delegable" duty of care which existed in spite of any contractual requirements. Id.
It seems difficult to reconcile an independent duty of care on the part of the contractor with the
government contract defense. Such a duty seems to make compliance with state specifications an
irrelevant factor. See also Transcon Lines v. Cornell Constr. Co., 539 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Okla.
1975). Cf. Clifton v. Struck Constr. Co., 2 Ohio Op. 142, 144 (C.P. 1935) (plaintiff's motion to
strike that portion of defendant's answer raising the government contract defense granted; de-
fendant would be liable for any negligent acts whether or not they were caused by following the
discretion of state architects).
160 In several cases plaintiffs sued on other theories of recovery as well.
151 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974).
165 A variation of the government contract defense was considered in Whitaker v.
Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969), reh'g denied, 424 F.2d 549, 551 (5th Cir.
1970), decided several years previous to Foster. In Whitaker, the plaintiff, a former serviceman,
had been injured during basic training when a grenade prematurely exploded. Id. at 1012. He
sued the grenade and fuse manufacturers on theories of negligence, strict liability and, breach of
warranty, alleging defective manufacture of the grenade. Id. Both defendant manufacturers
claimed that they were immune from suit because they were agents of the government, and
therefore their actions had been the actions of the United States. Id. at 1013-14. In support of its
claim of agent status, one of the defendants, Day & Zimmerman, claimed that its facility was
wholly owned by the government, that all component parts of the product had been the property
of the government, and that the assembly of the grenades had rigidly followed the government
specifications. Id. at 1013. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the
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had been injured when a hand grenade exploded in his hand while he was
undergoing an army training exercise. 163
 He sued the grenade and fuse
manufacturers on a theory of strict liability and obtained a judgment in his
favor.'" On appeal the defendants claimed that they were protected from
liability by the government contract defense.'" The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that the government contract defense had
been recognized in cases involving the construction of public improvements, 166
but rejected the defendants' claim to the defense. 167
 The court stated: "The
doctrine of sovereign immunity may not be extended to cover the fault of a
private corporation . . .."168
 In a footnote, however, the court stated that
"[t]he government's specifications did not call for the defendants to assemble a
defectively made grenade. '" 69
 Thus, the court apparently left open the
possibility that a manufacturer could invoke the defense where an injury-
causing defect can be traced to nondiscretionary government specifications.
The court's refusal to allow the defense in Foster thus seems attributable to the
court's determination that the defect was one in manufacture and not in
design. 170
defendant's claim that it was acting as the agent of the government, relying on a prior Supreme
Court ruling that Day & Zimmerman was an independent contractor under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. Id. at 1014. The court also noted that the government contract expressly stated
that the defendant was not an agent. Id, Thus, it appears that the defense rejected by the court
was a slightly different version of the shared immunity defense discussed above. The defendants
do not appear to have claimed the limited form of shared immunity, applicable to contractors
sued in their individual capacity. Rather, they seem to have claimed that such a close agency
relationship existed between themselves and the government that the suit amounted to a suit
against the United States and therefore the suit should have been barred under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 895A, comment c (1965)
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 895D (1965).
16' Foster, 502 F.2d at 869.
164 Id.
166 Id. at 873.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 874.
168 Id.
166 Id. at 874 n.5.
17° It should be noted that apparently there is nothing in either the government contract
defense or the contract specification defense which automatically prevents a manufacturer from
raising the defense in cases involving manufacturing as opposed to design defects. The defenses
are not phrased in terms of a design/manufacturing defect dichotomy. It is clear, however, that a
manufacturer would have an uphill battle in convincing a court that it had no discretion in its
manufacturing process, or that the manufacture of the product was entirely mandated by the
contract specifications. Nevertheless, a few manufacturers, including Day and Zimmerman,
have raised the defenses in such situations, with mixed results. Id. at 873. See, e.g., Montgomery
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Montgomery was an ad-
miralty action which arose out of the crash of a navy dirigible allegedly caused by faulty manufac-
ture of the dirigible. Id. at 449. The defendant argued that the government had exercised almost
complete control over manufacture and that the work had been completed according to specifica-
tions and under the government's inspection. Id. at 451. The court refused to grant summary
judgment for the defendant, stating that there was a question of fact as to whether the govern-
ment had directed the exact methods to be used in manufacturing the dirigible. Id. See also
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Independent Metal Prod. Co,, 203 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1953). Maryland
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Although the Foster court did not explicitly recognize the viability of the
government contract defense, several other courts have held that the defense
can be invoked successfully in a strict liability action involving defective
military products."' For example, in Sanner v. Ford Motor Co. ,"2 a passenger in
an army jeep was thrown from the jeep and injured."' The jeep had been
manufactured by Ford in accordance with government specifications. 174 The
passenger sued Ford on a strict liability theory, claiming that the jeep was
defectively designed because it had no seat belts and no rollbar. 175 The defend-
ant claimed that it was immune from liability because it had manufactured the
jeep in strict conformance with government specifications. 1 ?6 The Superior
Court of New Jersey, citing cases involving both the contract specification and
the government contract defenses, held that Ford could not be held liable.'"
Because the court cited to both lines of cases without clearly indicating which
line it was adopting, the doctrinal basis for its holding is somewhat ambiguous.
It probably is significant, however, that the court did not inquire whether the
alleged defect was obviously dangerous, that it relied heavily on considerations
of public policy, and that it spoke in terms of the manufacturer being "in-
sulated from liability. "178
 aspects of the decision, together with the
defendant's claim of immunity, indicate that the court probably adopted the
goyernment contract defense.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the
superior court's decision.'" The court interpreted the trial court's decision to
mean that a defendant who has manufactured a product in strict compliance
with government specifications cannot be held liable for any defect in the prod-
uct "under any circumstances."'" This interpretation by the appellate court
tends to confirm that both the trial court and appellate court adopted the
government contract defense. The court stated that although the cases upon
which the trial court relied involved negligence actions, the underlying policy
reasons for shielding a manufacturer from liability for acts done in manufactur-
Cas. Co. was a private contract case in which a defense similar to the contract specification de-
fense was raised. The court held that where the manufacturer was given plans for a gasoline
trailer tank by the purchaser, where every phase of manufacture was supervised by the pur-
chaser, who had authority to reject work for defects in material and workmanship, and where the
purchaser did not require the manufacturer to make tests or inspections but did so itself, the
manufacturer was not liable for failing to discover a piece of welding rod in the tank which subse-
quently lodged in a valve and prevented its closing. Id. at 843-44.
17 ' See text and notes at notes 172-228 infra.
1 " 144 N.J, Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805
(1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978).
'" Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. at 3, 364 A.2d at 43-44.
1 " Id.
176 Id. at 5, 364 A.2d at 44-45.
16 Id. at 4-5, 364 A.2d at 44.
'" Id. at 8-9, 364 A.2d at 46-47.
176 Id.
Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 154 N.J. Super. at 410, 381 A.2d at 806.
"G Id. at 409, 381 A.2d at 806.
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ing a product according to government plans were equally applicable to suits
brought under a theory of strict liability."' Presumably, the policy reasons
referred to by the court were those discussed by the lower court. One such
reason relied upon by the trial court was that imposing liability "would
seriously impair the governments [sic] ability to formulate policy and make
judgments pursuant to its war powers. The government is the agency charged
with the responsibility of deciding the nature and type of military equipment
that best suits its needs, not a manufacturer such as Ford."'" The lower court
also quoted the passage from Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 183
 which
noted that imposing liability on manufacturers would undermine the policy
behind the FTCA and would raise contract prices."' Both the appellate and
trial courts emphasized that Ford was entitled to the protection of the govern-
ment contract defense because under the terms of the contract it could not exer-
cise discretion in determining whether to provide the safety features.' 89
 The
trial judge found that there had been a conscious, intentional determination by
the United States government that the installation of seat belts would be in-
compatible with the intended use of the vehicle.'"
In 1980, two courts followed the Sanner court's lead and acknowledged the
applicability of the government contract defense to products liability actions.
In Casablanca v. Casabianca,' 87 an infant plaintiff severely injured his hand in a
machine in his father's pizza shop. 199 The machine had been built according to
army specifications for use in field kitchens during World War 11.' 99 The plain-
tiff sued the manufacturer of the machine under theories of negligence, strict
liability and breach of warranty, alleging that the design of the machine was
faulty."° In granting the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment, the
Supreme Court of Bronx County, New York held that the manufacturer's
adherence to the government's specifications provided it a complete defense to
any action based upon design, whether the design was faulty or not. 19 ' The
court stated that a supplier to the military in time of war has a right to rely
upon specifications and is not obligated to withhold from the United States
1" Id. at 409-10, 381 A.2d at 806.
152 Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47.
"3 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
i" Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. at 9, 364 A.2d at 47.
155 Id. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 154 N.J. Super. at 410, 381 A.2d at 806.
156 Id.
187
 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
155
	 Misc. 2d at 349, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 401.
559 Id.
199 Id.
191 Id. at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The court seems to have implied that compliance
with specifications is a complete defense even to an action based on breach of warranty. The
court cited no authority for this proposition, however. The court first disposed of the breach of
warranty claim by saying that there was no privity between the parties, but went on to say that
"... all of the causes of action alleged appear to involve an issue ... not previously determined
... in this state . . ." Id. at 349, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 401. The court then decided that conform-
ance with specifications is a complete defense to "any" action based on design. Id. at 350, 428
N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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0
armed forces material believed by the government to be necessary even if the
manufacturer considers the design to be imprudent or dangerous. 192 Thus, the
court echoed the Sanner court's concern with the prospect of manufacturers,
and consequently courts, sitting in judgment over military policy decisions. 193
In view of the court's statement that compliance with specifications is a com-
plete defense, even if the manufacturer believes the specifications to be impru-
dent or dangerous, it seems evident that the court adopted some version of the
government contract defense. This conclusion is buttressed by the court's
reference to the defense in Casablanca as an "immunity" which attaches to
government procurements for military purposes or in time of war.' 94
The most recent case dealing with the government contract defense is In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation.' 95 The plaintiffs, Vietnam war veterans
and members of their families, claimed to have suffered injuries resulting from
the veterans' exposure in Vietnam to a variety of herbicides, including Agent
Orange.' 96 The plaintiffs sued the manufacturers of Agent Orange, asserting
numerous theories of liability, including strict liability, negligence, and breach
of warranty.'" The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting the
government contract defense.'" They claimed that they had manufactured
Agent Orange in strict compliance with government specifications, and that
the specifications had contained no obvious or "glaring" defects. 199 The de-
fendants also claimed that the government had invented Agent Orange, had
experimented with herbicides, and had known of the product's dangers. 02 0 In
addition, the defendants claimed that they had been compelled to manufacture
and sell Agent Orange at a price set by the government201 under the authority
of the Defense Production Act. 202
192 Id, at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
191
	 text and note at note 182 supra.
194 Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
195 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. '1980); 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
145
	 F. Supp. at 768.
1" Id. at 769.
19° Id. at 792.
199 Id. at 795. By asserting that the specifications contained no obvious defects, the
defendants apparently attempted to protect themselves from the possibility that a defense similar
to the contract specification defense would be applied instead of a complete defense.
200 Id. at 794-95.
201 Id.
202 50 U.S.C. app. 5 2061-2169 (1976). Section 2071 of the Act provides in pertinent
part:
The President is hereby authorized (1) to require that performance under con-
tracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) which he deems necessary or
appropriate to promote the national defense shall take priority over performance
under any other contract or order, and, for the purpose of assuring such priority,
to require acceptance and performance of such contracts or orders in preference to
other contracts or orders by an person he finds to be capable of their performance,
and (2) to allocate materials and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions,
and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the na-
tional defense.
50 U.S.C. 5 2071. Penalties for violating 5 2071 are provided in 5 2073:
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
recognized the viability of the government contract defense under the facts
presented in the Agent Orange case, but it denied defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment because there still were unresolved questions of fact concerning
whether the defendants had satisfied the elements necessary to invoke the
defense."3
 In reaching its decision the court relied primarily on the line of cases
involving public works projects.'" The court reasoned that tort principles seek
to impose liability on a wrongdoer whose act or omission caused the injury and
not on an "innocent" contractor.'" The court also cited Dolphin Gardens206 for
the proposition that to impose liability would increase contract prices and
subvert the government's immunity. 207
 The court then added a significant
reason for its decision:
These considerations take on increased significance when the govern-
ment contracts with manufacturers of military ordnance in wartime.
Where, as here, manufacturers claim to have been compelled by
federal law to produce a weapon of war without ability to negotiate
specifications, contract price or terms, the potential for unfairly im-
posing liability becomes great. Without the government contract de-
fense a manufacturer capable of producing military goods for govern-
ment use would face the untenable position of choosing between
severe penalties for failing to supply products necessary to conduct a
war, and producing what the government requires but at a contract
price that makes no provision for the need to insure against potential
liability for design flaws in the government's plans. 208
Thus, the court concluded that basic fairness outweighs imposing liability on
manufacturers who are compelled by the full powers of the government to pro-
duce a defective product. The court quoted approvingly that portion of the
court's opinion in Casablanca v. Casabiancam which stated that a manufacturer's
adherence to government specifications is a complete defense to any action
based on defective design, regardless of whether the design is faulty or whether
the manufacturer considers the design imprudent or dangerous. 21 °
Despite the Agent Orange court's reliance on the broad expression of the
government contract defense contained in the Casablanca opinion, the court
issued a subsequent opinion which somewhat narrowed the circumstances in
Any person who willfully performs any act prohibited, or willfully fails to perform
any act required, by the provisions of this title [§5 2071-2074 of this appendix] or
any rule, regulation, or order thereunder, shall, upon conviction, be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
202 506 F. Supp. at 796.
204 Id. at 792-94.
203 Id. at 792-93.
2 °9 Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
2°2 In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 794.
2°8 Id.
209 104 Misc. 2d 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
200 In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 794.
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which the defense can be raised.'" This subsequent opinion focused more
closely on the elements which the defendants must establish in order to invoke
the government contract defense.'" The defendants claimed that the govern-
ment contract defense could be invoked regardless of whether the specifications
contained glaring or patent defects. 213 The court largely rejected this conten-
tion by stating that the defendants would be able to invoke the defense only if
they could prove three elements. The defendants would have to prove that the
government established the specifications for the product; that the product
complied with the government specifications in all material respects; and that
the government knew as much as or more than the defendants did about the
hazards that accompanied use of the product.'" With respect to the third ele-
ment, that the government's knowledge of a product's dangers be at least equal
to that of the manufacturer, the court imposed on manufacturers a duty to
warn of a product's dangers.'" The court stated that if the manufacturers
knew of hazards which might reasonably have affected the government's use of
the product, and if the manufacturers failed to disclose the hazards to the
government, then the government contract defense would fail.'" Thus, it
would appear that under the Agent Orange court's formulation of the defense,
failure to warn of a product's dangers would have a two-fold effect. First, plain-
tiffs would presumably have a cause of action for failure to warn. Second, the
failure to warn would preclude the raising of the government contract defense,
thus giving rise to a cause of action for a defect in design. 2 ' 7 It appears,
however, that the court may have imposed on manufacturers a duty to warn
only of dangers of which the manufacturers had actual knowledge. 218 The court
did not explicitly state that manufacturers have a duty to warn of dangers of
which they should have known.
By recognizing the government contract defense only in cases in which the
manufacturer's knowledge of a product's dangers is not superior to that of the
government, the Agent Orange court introduced an element not mentioned in the
Sanner or Casablanca opinions. Under the Agent Orange court's formulation of the
defense, compliance with government specifications alone does not provide a
complete defense. Such compliance provides a defense only if the government's
knowledge about a product is at least equal to that of the manufacturer. 219
211
 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
212 Id. at 1053-54.
212
	
at 1057.
214 Id. at 1055.
212
	
at 1055, 1057.
216 Id. at 1057.
2 " The court did not explicitly address this apparent two-fold effect. The court merely
stated that in the event the defense could not be established, the litigation would proceed to issues
of negligence, strict liability, causation and damages. Id. at 1056.
218 Id. at 1055, 1057-58. Nevertheless, by placing on defendants the burden of proving
that the government had as much knowledge as defendants did, the court may have made it dif-
ficult for defendants to establish the defense.
219 Id. at 1055.
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Thus, under the Agent Orange court's interpretation, it may be more difficult for
manufacturers to invoke the defense.
In summary, the Sanner, Casablanca and In re Agent Orange cases have
established the viability of the government contract defense for manufacturers
of defectively designed military products. As construed in Casablanca and In re
Agent Orange, the government contract defense bars actions for defective design
based on any theory of recovery, including negligence, strict liability and
breach of warranty. 22° In contrast, there is a split of authority on the issue
whether the contract specification defense can be invoked in a strict liability ac-
tion."' In addition, the government contract defense, as construed by the San-
ner and Casablanca courts, bars recovery for a defect in design under any cir-
cumstances, even when the design is faulty, and even when the manufacturer
considers the design imprudent or dangerous. 222 In contrast, the contract
specification defense does not protect manufacturers where the design
specifications are obviously defective and dangerous.'" Because the govern-
ment contract defense may bar recovery for a design defect even where a design
is obviously defective and dangerous, the defense may be more complete than
the contract specification defense. The government contract defense may not
operate as a bar to recovery in an action for failure to warn, however. One
court has indicated that manufacturers who fail to disclose hazards in their
products of which they are aware and of which the government is ignorant may
not claim the protection of the government contract defense. 224 Similarly, there
is some indication that courts recognizing the contract specification defense
also may impose on manufacturers a limited duty to warn of a product's
dangers. 225
Although the government contract defense appears to be broader than the
contract specification defense, it may be limited to special circumstances. One
limiting factor with respect to the availability of the government contract
defense may be that the defendants in all these recent cases were manufacturers
of military products. Indeed, the Casablanca court specifically limited its holding
to procurements for military purposes in time of war. 226 In addition, the
220 Id. at 1055-56; Casablanca v. Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d
400, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1980). See note 191 supra.
2" See text and notes at notes 60-94 supra.
222 See text and notes at notes 180 and 191-92 supra.
222 See text and note at note 21 supra.
224
 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1057 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
223 See text and notes at notes 100-06 supra.
226 Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402. It might be argued that Sanner
and In re Agent Orange also limited the applicability of the government contract defense to military
procurements during wartime, since the sales of the equipment took place during the Vietnam
War. The appellate court in Sanner did not so confine its holding, however. See Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co., 154 N.J. Super. 407, 409-10, 381 A.2d 805, 806 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384
A.2d 846 (1978). Furthermore, it would seem that the reasoning offered by the court in In re Agent
Orange is equally applicable to military procurements during peacetime. For example, the court
stressed the potential unfairness of imposing liability on manufacturers who were compelled to
produce under the authority of the Defense Production Act. In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at
794. The Defense Production Act does not appear to limit the power of the government to compel
production to time of war. See note 202 supra.
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government contract defense has been successfully invoked mainly in cases in
which one would expect a court to be sympathetic to a defendant's claims of
unfairness. For instance, the defense has been successfully invoked when the
challenged design was consciously chosen by the military agencies of the
government after a weighing of the risks and benefits. 227 The viability of the
government contract defense in cases where a defect in design was or should
have been obvious to the manufacturer but was unknown to the government
seems doubtful. The court in In re Agent Orange stated that a manufacturer
which has actual knowledge of dangerous defects and which fails to share this
knowledge with the government will be unable to invoke the government con-
tract defense. 228 Thus, under the Agent Orange court's formulation of the
defense, there may be little practical distinction between the government con-
tract defense and the contract specification defense in those cases in which the
manufacturer actually knew of the defect. The court's opinion still leaves some
open questions, however. The court did not indicate whether the government
contract defense would fail in cases where a defect should have been obvious to a
manufacturer, but where the manufacturer nevertheless was not aware of the
defect. Furthermore, the Sanner and Casablanca opinions did not limit the
availability of the defense to cases in which the government had as much
knowledge about a product's hazards as the manufacturer. Thus, it is still not
clear whether the position taken by the Agent Orange court will be followed by
other courts or whether compliance with specifications will be a complete
defense regardless of the respective knowledge of the government and the man-
ufacturer.
Nevertheless, certain tentative trends can be discerned with respect to the
availability of the contract specification defense and government contract de-
fense to manufacturers selling products to the federal government. In cases in-
volving nonmilitary products it appears that the contract specification defense
can be raised in a suit for negligent design. 229 It is not clear, however, whether
the contract specification defense can defeat an action brought under a theory
of strict liability or breach of warranty. 23° In cases involving military products,
the trend is to allow the government contract defense to defeat any action for
227 The Sanner case clearly is in this mold. Even in Casabianca, the court said: "A supplier
to the military in time of war has a right to rely upon such , specifications and is not obligated to
withhold from the United States armed forces materials believed by the latter to be necessary . . . ."
(emphasis added). Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The court may have felt
that the design specified by the government was a conscious choice. Courts can be expected to be
more sympathetic where the government has made a conscious design choice, since these are the
cases in which the "discretionary function" exception to the FTCA seems most clearly ap-
plicable. Courts are most likely to view a government decision as discretionary where there has
been a balancing of policy considerations, such as a cost/benefit analysis or risk/utility analysis.
See note , 1 supra for a discussion of the discretionary function exception. Other types of design
defects also may arise, such as those resulting from inadvertant errors or miscalculations by the
government. The plight of the manufacturer in such cases may not arouse as much sympathy,
however, at least where the defect was one which was or should have been obvious to the
manufacturer.
229 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1057 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
229 See text and notes at notes 107-111 supra.
2" See text and notes at notes 60-98 supra.
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defective design, regardless of the theory of recovery. 231 It is unclear, however,
whether the government, contract defense also can be successfully raised in
cases involving nonmilitary products. If the government contract defense could
be successfully raised by manufacturers of nonmilitary products, it would seem
to make the contract specification defense superfluous.
The lack of certainty and consistency in these trends indicates that courts
have not fully focused on the possible distinctions between the government con-
tract defense and the contract specification defense. In addition, courts have
not explicitly discussed whether a different standard of liability should apply to
manufacturers of military products than to manufacturers of other products
sold to the government. Indeed, recent cases concerning the liability of a
government contractor for defectively designed products have raised more
issues than they have resolved. The remainder of this note will analyze several
of these unresolved issues in order to determine appropriate standards of
liability for manufacturers selling products to the federal government. One
question which will be analyzed is whether a manufacturer which complies
with government specifications should be entitled to a complete defense in any
products liability action for defective design, even where the defect was or
should have been obvious to the manufacturer. Consideration will be given to
whether a complete defense is justified only in cases involving the sale of
military products. It will be suggested that in most cases such a complete
defense is overly broad. A more limited defense, similar to the contract specifi-
cation defense, will be proposed for cases involving both military and nonmili-
tary products. Appropriate standards for determining a manufacturer's liabili-
ty for failure to warn also will be suggested. Finally, the question of whether
the more limited proposed defense should be available in a strict liability or
breach of warranty action as well as a negligence action will be addressed. It
will be submitted that the proposed defense should be available regardless of
the theory of recovery under which a plaintiff sues.
III. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING
A MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY
The remainder of this note will attempt to determine the appropriate
standards of liability for government contractors who manufacture defectively
designed products. The first question in this inquiry is whether compliance
with government specifications should provide a complete bar to any cause of
action based on defective design even when a dangerous defect was or should
have been obvious to the manufacturer. Some recent cases have suggested that
n See text and notes at notes 160-228 supra. A significant exception to this trend is
Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. 512 F, 2d 77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for misap-
plication of conflict of laws rules, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). In Challoner, the court rejected the applicability
of the contract specification defense, indicating that a manufacturer of a military product could
be held strictly liable for a design defect. See text and notes at notes 68-75 supra. It is not clear,
however, whether the government contract defense was specifically raised in Challoner.
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compliance with government specifications operates as a complete shield for
manufacturers of military products, 222 but the issue has not been definitively
resolved either with respect to manufacturers of military products or with
respect to manufacturers of nonmilitary products sold to the federal govern-
ment. Specifically, the court in In re Agent Orange stated that compliance with
specifications does not provide a defense unless the government's knowledge
about a product's dangers is at least equal to that of the manufacturer. 232 If
compliance with specifications should be a complete defense to an action for
defective design in all cases, then any further consideration of more limited
defenses is unnecessary. If such a complete shield to liability cannot be
justified, however, it must be determined whether a more limited defense,
similar to the contract specification defense, is more appropriate, and whether
it should be available in a strict liability or breach of warranty action as well as
in a negligence action. In determining merit of a defense similar to the contract
specification defense, the relative merit of the more restrictive version of the
government contract defense adopted by the Agent Orange court must be con-
sidered. Furthermore, in determining the appropriate defense in design defect
cases, the scope of a manufacturer's liability for failure to warn of a product's
dangers also must be examined.
A. Should Manufacture in Accordance with Government Specifications
Constitute a Complete Defense Under All Circumstances?
In recent products liability cases involving the sale of military products to
the federal government, some courts have concluded that by virtue of the
government contract defense, a manufacturer who has fully complied with
government specifications cannot be held liable for a product's defective design
under any circumstances. 234 Recovery is barred under this theory even if the
product in fact is defective and was considered dangerous by the
manufacturer. 235 The question arises whether the adoption of such a complete
defense by the courts in products liability cases was dictated by precedent, or
whether it was primarily a response to serious policy concerns. If the recogni-
tion of the defense in products liability cases is the result of policy concerns, the
question is whether these policy concerns justify a defense as broad as the for-
mulation of the government contract defense articulated by some courts.
Precedent demonstrates that the government contract defense traditional-
ly was almost entirely a creature of public works cases. 2" There was virtually
no precedent for extending the government contract defense to products liabili-
ty actions."' Even in the public works cases, the defense rarely was allowed in
232 See text and note at note 222 supra.
233 See text and note at note 214 supra.
234 See text and notes at note 180 and notes 191-92 supra.
235 See text and notes at notes 191-92 supra
236 See text and note at note 123 supra.
237 Id.
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cases involving personal injuries. 2" In addition, courts in many public works
cases had held that the government contract defense should not apply to
ultrahazardous activities, and that contractors which engaged in such activities
are strictly liable for any damage or injury they cause." This background of
case law hardly seems to have required the extension of the government con-
tract defense to products liability cases. Indeed, had the courts desired not to
extend the defense to products liability cases, they could have cited three
reasons in this body of precedent for not extending it. First, the defense was
traditionally relegated to public works cases. Second, products liability cases
generally involve personal injuries, and even in the public works cases the
defense rarely was allowed in cases involving personal injuries. Third, refusing
to extend the government contract defense to products liability cases would
have been consistent with the refusal in earlier public works cases to extend the
defense to contractors engaged in ultrahazardous activities. The growth of
strict liability theory in the area of products liability and the growth of strict
liability theory in the area of ultrahazardous activities share a common
underlying rationale. That rationale is that commercial enterprises which are
in the best position to distribute the risk of harm should not be allowed to shift a
ruinous loss to the shoulders of an injured and innocent plaintiff, but should
"pay their way. " 2" Thus, precedent did not require extending the govern-
ment contract defense to products liability cases.
Even if one accepts the public works cases as valid precedent for allowing
the government contract defense in products liability actions, there is little
direct support in those cases for the broad statement of the defense articulated
by the court in Casabianca. 24 ' The Casablanca court stated that a manufacturer is
not liable even if the design is defective and even if the manufacturer believes it
to be dangerous. 242
 This statement suggests that a manufacturer is shielded
from liability even if the government's specifications are obviously defective
and dangerous. The Casablanca court's reference to the defense as a
"complete" defense 2" supports this interpretation of the court's ruling. The
Casablanca court cited little authority for its broad interpretations of the govern-
ment contract defense, however. 244
 Moreover, the authority in the public
works cases is scarce and conflicting as to whether a contractor is protected
2'8
	 text and notes at notes 157-59 supra.
239 See text and notes at notes 148-50 supra.
299 See PROSSER, supra note 19, at 22, 509.
24 ' Casablanca v. Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 350, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 400, 402 (Sup. Ct.
1980).
342 Casablanca, 104 Misc. 2d at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
"3 Id.
344 The only authority cited by the Casablanca court which provides any support for its
position was Sanner v. Ford Motor, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), cert. denied, 75
N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978). The Casablanca court also cited Hunt v. Blasius, 74 111. 2d 203,
384 N.E.2d 368 (1978). The Hunt court, however, adopted the contract specification defense, not
the government contract defense. See note 92 supra.
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when the government's specifications are obviously defective and
dangerous. 245
Although precedent does not appear to have mandated extending the
government contract defense to products liability cases or construing the
defense as broadly as the Casabianca court did, the fact remains that several
courts recently have allowed the defense in cases involving military products.
These courts apparently have been persuaded that policy considerations
justified extending the scope of the defense. 246 These policy considerations will
be examined and tested for their merit in order to determine the propriety of
the defense in products liability suits. In doing so, it is important to bear in
mind that the question is first whether these policy considerations justify some
limitations on the liability of manufacturers, and second whether these policy
considerations justify a complete bar to recovery under all circumstances when
a manufacturer complies with government specifications. 247
Several policy reasons suggest that the shared immunity defense should
protect a manufacturer who complies with the express requirements of a
government contract. Strong counterarguments, however, suggest that the
government contract defense as articulated by some courts is too absolute, and
that tort principles can be fashioned which take account of legitimate public
policy concerns while eliminating some of the potential inequities of the
defense.
1. Frustration of Government Endeavors
One rationale which could be cited in support of limiting manufacturer
liability is that allowing liability to be imposed on manufacturers for a design
furnished by the government would result in manufacturers being either
unable or unwilling to provide their products to the government. This reluc-
246 See text and notes at notes 143-44 supra.
246 See text and notes at notes 171-228 supra.
247 To the extent the government contract defense is viewed as a sharing of the federal
government's immunity, the issue may arise whether the proper scope of manufacturer immuni-
ty is to be governed by federal common law. See note 132 supra. In In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.
Litig., 506 F. Supp. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) rev'd far lack of subject jurisdictivn 635 F.2d 987 (2nd Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3487 (1981), the plaintiffs argued that their claims against the
defendant manufacturers should be governed by federal common law. Id. at 743. The trial
court's decision to apply federal common law was reversed on appeal. In re Agent Orange, 635 F.2d
at 995. In in re Agent Orange, however, the issue was whether the plaintiffs had a federal cause of ac-
tion so as to provide the district court with subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 988. The court of ap-
peals did not focus on the more narrow question whether any immunities claimed by the defend-
ants were to be governed by federal common law. This note does not attempt to resolve whether
state law or federal law should define the scope of a manufacturer's defense against actions for
design defects in products sold to the federal government. It is expected, however, that similar
policy concerns will guide a determination of the proper scope of a manufacturer's defense or im-
munity, regardless of whether the standard applied is based on federal or state law. For this
reason, the discussion which follows is relevant whether the goal is to fashion a federal or state
standard.
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tance of manufacturers. to deal with the government would inhibit the govern-
ment from carrying out its essential functions. Although this rationale has not
appeared explicitly in the recent products liability cases, it was expressed in the
cases involving public works improvements. For example, it was suggested by
one court that the availability of a private nuisance action would prevent con-
tractors from fulfilling their public works functions. 248 This rationale, however,
is far less cogent in the area of products liability. A manufacturer already faces
the threat of substantial liability for defects in the manufacturing process.
Therefore, it is doubtful that the additional incremental risk of liability for
defective design would prevent a manufacturer from selling a product to the
government. A more likely result of an increased exposure to liability would be
that manufacturers would raise their contract prices, passing on to the govern-
ment the cost of added insurance. The only conceivable exception to the
manufacturer's willingness to sell a product might be where a product is so
dangerous that its sale might involve potentially unlimited liability against
which a manufacturer would have difficulty insuring itself. The potential for
unlimited liability, however, already exists in the case of manufacturing as op-
posed to design defects. Nevertheless, courts have not allowed any concern for
the willingness of manufacturers to enter contracts to prevent them from im-
posing liability for manufacturing defects. Furthermore, cases of potentially
unlimited liability would be rare, at least in the case of nonmilitary products.
These rare cases do not justify an overly broad shared immunity defense. Any
serious chilling effect on manufacturers resulting from such rare cases
presumably will be noticed by government agencies seeking to award con-
tracts. In exceptional cases, the legislature could limit liability as it did in the
area of nuclear energy with the Price-Anderson Act 249 and in the immunization
area with the Swine Flue Immunization Act."°
2. Circumvention of the "Discretionary Function" Exception of the FTCA
An additional rationale for the government contract defense is that if liabil-
ity is imposed on a manufacturer for defects in design resulting from faulty
government specifications, the manufacturer will pass on to the government
the cost of added insurance. Thus, in effect, the government will be paying for
injuries resulting from its discretionary decisions as to design. The "discre-
tionary function" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), however,
was intended to foreclose suits against the government which challenge such
discretionary decisions. 251
 Thus, by imposing liability on the manufacturer,
the discretionary function exception to the FTCA would be circumvented. This
248 See text and note at note 138 supra. Although the court in In re Agent Orange did not
mention this argument, the argument was present in one of the public works cases on which the
court relied. In re Agent Orange, 506 F. Supp. at 793 (citing Green v. ICI America, Inc., 363 F,
Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn. 1973)).
242 42 U.S.C. $S 2012, 2014, 2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239 (1976).
2" 42 U.S.C. S 247(b), (j)-(1) (1976).
2" See note 1 supra.
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rationale was expressed by the court in the Sanner case. 252 This rationale
assumes, however, that the government in fact always would be immune from
a direct suit when the government contract defense successfully is invoked by a
contractor. Yet some courts have indicated that it may not be necessary for the
government to be immune in order for the manufacturer to invoke the govern-
ment contract defense. 2 " In such cases, where the government would not be
immune from a direct suit, but the manufacturer could raise the defense, the
manufacturer would have the benefit of a form of limited immunity in its own
right. 254 The rationale that the government contract defense is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the government's immunity clearly has no merit in
such cases. 255 Where the government would be unable to claim immunity,
allowing injured plaintiffs to proceed against the manufacturer obviously
would not result in circumventing the government's immunity.
Even where the government would be immune from suit, however, pro-
viding a complete defense under all circumstances still is an overly broad
means of preventing the circumvention of the discretionary function exception
to the FTCA. For example, in some cases the government might be unable suc-
cessfully to invoke the "discretionary function" exception. 255 Nevertheless, the
government still could be immune from suit under another exception to the
FTCA such as the "incident to service" exception. That exception bars suits
by former servicemen for injuries sustained during their service. 257 If the
government contract defense were construed as providing a complete defense
under all circumstances, a plaintiff serviceman would be barred from suing the
manufacturer for a defect in design. The plaintiff would be barred even though
the government would be unable to invoke the discretionary function excep-
tion. This result occurs despite the elimination of any potential circumvention
of the discretionary function exception. The government would be immune
under the "incident to service" exception to the FTCA simply because the suit
252 See text and note at note 184 supra. The court in in re Agent Orange also expressed this
rationale. See text and note at note 207 supra. The court ultimately expressed a more limited for-
mulation of the government contract defense, however. See text and notes at notes 211-19 supra.
253 See note 136 supra.
254 Id
2" Of course, one response in this particular class of cases could be to require that govern-
ment immunity be a condition precedent to the availability of the defense. This response,
however, does not answer the remaining arguments above with respect to cases in which the
government is immune.
256 It is by no means clear that all of the government's decisions as to design are pro-
tected by the "discretionary function" exception. Commentators have suggested that the courts
in the past have been somewhat inconsistent in their approach to what constitutes a "planning
level" versus an "operational level" decision. Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discre-
tionary Function Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 161, 170 (1976). Furthermore, not all
defects in design are attributable to conscious policy choices. The closer the defect comes to an in-
advertant error in drafting the specifications as opposed to a conscious planning choice, the less
likely that it would fall within the parameters of the discretionary function exception. See id. at
117-72.
257 See text and note at note 1 supra.
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was brought by a serviceman. A possible justification for this result is the policy
of preventing a manufacturer from passing on to the government the cost of ad-
ded insurance in any circumstance in which the government would be immune
from suit, regardless of whether immunity is predicated on the discretionary
function exception to the FTCA or some other exception. Yet this argument
does not withstand scrutiny. In the hypothetical situation just described, the
serviceman who would be prevented by the government contract defense from
suing the manufacturer for a defect in design could sue the manufacturer if the
defect were one in manufacture. 258
 The serviceman could sue even though the
manufacturer might pass along to the government the added cost of insuring
itself against such claims of mismanufacture. The passing on of such costs is
tolerated even though it tends to undermine the government's immunity from
suit under the "incident to service" exception to the FTCA. Other cases also
can be found in which courts have accepted some circumvention of the govern-
ment's immunity. 259
 Thus, there are cases in which the inequities of not pro-
viding a remedy to injured plaintiffs are thought to justify some potential cir-
cumvention of government immunity. Nevertheless, the acceptance of such
circumvention in some cases does not mean that the factor of circumvention of
the government's immunity should be disregarded entirely in fashioning ap-
propriate standards of liability. Although providing a complete defense under
all circumstances is an overly broad means of preventing circumvention of the
discretionary function exception, the courts have a legitimate concern for
avoiding such circumvention as long as compelling countervailing considera-
tions are absent.
3. Increased Cost of Government Contracts
Closely related to the circumvention of the FTCA rationale is the concern
expressed in Carabianca26° that imposing liability on the manufacturer who fully
complies with government specifications will cause manufacturers to shift the
added cost of insurance to the government, increasing the cost of government
contracts. 291
 This rationale cannot withstand scrutiny. It is in the nature of the
insurance and private enterprise system that manufacturers pass on to the pur-
"9 See text and note at note 170 supra.
479
 For example, such circumvention occurs in the case of ultrahazardous activities when
public works contractors are prevented from invoking the government contract defense. See text
and notes 148-50 supra. Presumably, the cost of insurance is passed on to the government in these
cases, even though, had the government undertaken the work itself, it could not be held strictly
liable. See Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem. Corp., 37 N.J. 396, 416, 181 A.2d
487, 497 (1962), in which the court rejected the argument that the government would have been
immune had it undertaken rocket testing and that therefore the defendant contractor should not
be held strictly liable because he might pass the cost of insurance on to the government. Id. The
court considered such potential circumvention not controlling, since contractors who are
negligent likewise might pass on premiums or related costs but admittedly may not take advan-
tage of the government's immunity. Id.
9" Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
261 Id. at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at•402.
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chasers of their products the costs attributable to products liability suits. 262
Whether these purchasers be individual consumers or the government, they
pay for the cost of the manufacturer's insurance against risk of liability as
reflected in the cost of goods and services. 263 Thus, the government already
pays higher contract prices than it otherwise would pay in order to insure
manufacturers against the threat of liability inherent in existing tort law. In
other words, the increased costs paid by the government are the unavoidable
consequence of standards of liability created and modified over a number of
years. Therefore, just as the increased contract prices incident to existing tort
law would not justify insulating manufacturers from existing tort liability for
manufacturing defects, so too the threat of increased costs is not a sufficient ra-
tionale for allowing the government contract defense to protect manufacturers
against actions for defective design. Perhaps an argument can be made that
considerations of cost should at least be a factor in determining whether to in-
crease a manufacturer's liability for military products. Substantial increases in
cost for military products could place a drain on the Treasury during wartime,
when the nation can ill afford it. This argument is considered more fully in the
following section.
4. Impairment of the Government's Ability to Formulate Policy in Wartime
In the recent cases involving suits against manufacturers of military prod-
ucts, the courts have shown a concern for impairing the government's ability to
carry out its war powers effectively. 264 This concern may be a significant policy
reason for providing some limitations on the liability of manufacturers for in-
juries caused by defects in government designs. This article has suggested that
the increased costs to the government and the potential unwillingness of
manufacturers to contract with the government under a rule permitting
manufacturer liability for design defects do not compel the adoption of a
government contract defense, at least with respect to nonmilitary contracts.'"
In the case of military products, however, such considerations are more signifi-
cant. Defectively designed military products by their nature have a particularly
great potential for causing large numbers of personal injuries.'" Exposing
manufacturers to liability for defects in the government's design of these prod-
ucts might make manufacturers more reluctant to produce military products.
Such a result could affect the government's ability to defend the country ade-
quately. Even if manufacturers were willing to enter contracts, the potential for
substantially greater contract costs could place a significant drain on the
Treasury during wartime, when the nation could ill afford it. It may be argued
262 See PROSSER, supra note 19 at 22-23, 650; see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24
Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
263 Id.
264 See text and note at note 182 supra.
262
	
text and notes at notes 248-50 and 260-63 supra.
2" See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
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that if the government is concerned about ensuring supplies at reasonable
prices, it can invoke its powers under the Defense Production Act to compel
production at designated prices. 267
 Substantial reliance on the Defense Produc-
tion Act, however, might place undesirable wartime burdens on the govern-
ment by forcing government agencies to consume time and expense in compel-
ling manufacturers to comply with military production requirements. The
courts also have stressed the need to accord the government broad discretion in
determining military requirements.'" Imposing liability for defects in govern-
ment designs could involve manufacturers in second-guessing the decisions of
the executive branch of the federal government on matters of military policy.'"
Substantial second guessing and pressure by manufacturers could influence
military policy makers to depart from equipment designs which they believe
necessary. Furthermore, the courts also would find themselves in the difficult
position of routinely second-guessing the discretionary decisions of the ex-
ecutive branch on matters of military policy. 270 Some of these concerns may ap-
ply in the case of nonmilitary products as well. The concerns seem more com-
pelling in the case of military products, however, since the security of the na-
tion is more directly at stake. Nevertheless, it will be demonstrated that a more
limited defense, such as the contract specification defense, can accommodate
the need for effective formulation of military policy.
5. Basic Unfairness
In In re Agent Orarzge, 2" the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York suggested that imposing enormous liability on a manufac-
turer who had been forced to produce a product on the government's terms
would be unfair, since the manufacturer was not in a position to correct the act
or omission which caused the injury. 272
 The court was particularly concerned
about the potential for unfairness in cases involving military products. The
court feared that manufacturers might be compelled under penalty of law to
build military products according to the government's terms, and then be held
liable for defects in a design over which they had no contro1. 2 " Although the
desire to avoid basic unfairness may justify providing a defense to manufac-
turers in some circumstances, the Agent Orange court recognized that this con-
cern could not justify a complete defense in all cases in which manufacturers
267 See text and notes at notes 202 and 208 supra.
266 Set text and notes at notes 182 and 192 supra.
269 Id.
270 To some extent this concern is pertinent to cases involving nonmilitary products as
well. In those cases where the government is found to be exercising a discretionary function, the
removal of the manufacturer's immunity would involve courts in the scrutiny of discretionary
decisions committed to other branches of government. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
S 895D, comment f (1965).
271
	 re Agent Orange Prod, Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
272
	 at 793-94.
2r'
	 text at note 208 supra.
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comply with government specifications. 274 For example, the government
specifications may be known by the manufacturer to be defective and
dangerous, but the government might be unaware of the defect. If the
manufacturer nevertheless produces the product, principles of fairness would
militate against providing the manufacturer a defense. In any event, principles
of liability should be developed which are flexible enough to accommodate con-
cerns for basic fairness. If the government contract defense is interpreted to bar
recovery whenever the manufacturer complies with government specifications,
it will not provide the flexibility necessary to permit recovery when principles of
fairness so dictate.
The foregoing discussion has analyzed the rationales offered in behalf of
the government contract defense and has shown that some of the concerns
motivating the courts to allow the defense in products liability actions may
justify some limitations on manufacturer liability. Specifically, the desire to
avoid circumvention of the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, the
desire to prevent impairment of the government's ability to formulate military
policy, and the desire for basic fairness are legitimate concerns. The arguments
against the government contract defense, however, must be considered more
fully. The principal criticism of the defense as articulated by some courts is that
it is overly broad. Compliance with specifications is said to provide a complete
defense even in cases where the government's design is defective and where the
manufacturer considers the design imprudent or dangerous. 2" If this state-
ment of the defense were carried to its logical extreme without qualification,
manufacturers would be able to escape liability for building a product in com-
pliance with government specifications which were known beyond all doubt by
manufacturers to be defective and dangerous. Presumably, the defense would
extend beyond those cases in which the government has made a conscious deci-
sion in choosing a design. The manufacturer would be protected from liability
even if the obviously dangerous defect were unknown to the government and
caused by some inadvertent error or miscalculation on the part of the govern-
ment. Cases such as those just described, while perhaps somewhat extreme,
clearly are foreseeable, since many manufacturers are likely to have more ex-
pertise than the government in the manufacture of their products. Providing
manufacturers with a shield from liability in such circumstances could promote
reckless conduct. It is submitted that something less than a complete bar to
recovery would provide incentives for manufacturers to avoid reckless conduct
and would be more equitable to those injured by defective government prod-
ucts.
In summary, although some of the concerns motivating the courts in re-
cent products liability cases to allow the government contract defense do have
merit, there are strong arguments against allowing the defense to operate as an
27+ See text and notes at notes 211-19 supra.
275 See text and notes at notes 191-92 supra.
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automatic and complete bar to recovery in all cases. A standard of recovery
must be fashioned which provides incentives for manufacturers to avoid
reckless conduct and which at the same time takes into account legitimate
policy concerns. The discussion which follows will demonstrate that a more
limited defense, such as the contract specification defense, is a more ap-
propriate standard of recovery than a complete defense.
B. Standards By Which a Manufacturer's Liability
Should be Determined
The contract specification defense provides manufacturers with a certain
amount of protection from liability while eliminating the inequities inherent in
the government contract defense. In general, this defense protects a manufac-
turer from liability if it has fully complied with the contract specifications and
damage or injury results from a defect in those specifications. The defense is
not available, however, if the specifications were so obviously defective and
dangerous that a competent manufacturer would have been put on notice of the
defect and would have refused to follow the specifications." 6 Even where the
specifications were obviously defective and dangerous, however, it has been
held that if the party providing the specifications discovers the danger, or if the
danger is obvious to that party, his responsibility ordinarily supercedes that of
the manufacturer. 277 The appropriateness of this standard of liability will be
examined in the context of each of the three theories of recovery: negligence,
strict liability, and breach of warranty. In conjunction with this examination,
the issue of whether there should be a duty to warn of a product's defects and
dangers also will be addressed.
1. Negligence Theory
The contract specification defense is an appropriate defense to negligence
actions for defective design.'" The defense is consistent with negligence prin-
ciples. It simply is a variation on the "reasonable man" standard, in that it
recognizes that the ordinary manufacturer is not in a position to control and
understand the design of a product to the same extent as if the design were its
own.'" Where the manufacturer was given discretion as to design detail,'"
however, or where the defect in design was or should have been obvious to a
276 See text and note at note 21 supra.
277 See text and note at note 48 supra.
278 Courts have agreed that the contract specification defense may be raised in a prod-
ucts liability action alleging negligent design. See text and notes at notes 107-11 supra. The courts
in McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Ky. 1980), and Hunt v.
Blasius, 74111. 2d 203, 210, 384 N.E.2d 368, 371 (1978), held that the defense successfully can be
invoked in a negligence action by a manufacturer of products for a state government. By
analogy, the rule seems applicable to federal contracts as well.
279 See text and notes at notes 22 and 41-43 supra.
2" See text and notes at notes 49-59 supra.
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manufacturer of its skill and expertise, 281 the manufacturer should not be pro-
tected.
In those cases in which a defect was obvious to the manufacturer and
known or obvious to the government as well, it is appropriate in most cases that
the manufacturer be protected from liability for design defects as the defense
provides. 282 It has been suggested that the shifting of responsibility from the
manufacturer in such cases results from an absence of proximate cause. 1"
Whether stated in terms of causation or duty, manufacturers should in most
cases be entitled to expect that when the government is aware of a defect or
danger, it will remedy the defect, take appropriate precautions or order addi-
tional safety devices. This conclusion is buttressed by considerations of public
policy which require that manufacturers and courts not be placed in the posi-
tion of routinely second-guessing the informed discretionary decisions of the
government. 2 "
291
	
text and notes at notes 44-48 supra.
202 See text and note at note 48 supra.
2" See note 48 supra.
2" For a discussion of the public policy considerations which support this conclusion, see
text and notes at notes 251-59 and 264-74 supra. There may be extreme cases in which the shifting
of responsibility for design defects from manufacturers can be justified neither by principles of
proximate cause nor by policy considerations. For example, it may be obvious to a manufacturer
that a product is so extraordinarily defective and dangerous in relation to its intended use that no
precautions, safety devices or alterations can make it safe. If the government, with knowledge of
the danger, insists on buying the product, principles of proximate cause would not appear to
justify the shifting of responsibility from the manufacturer. See note 48 supra. Furthermore, public
policy concerns in such extreme cases are relatively weak when nonmilitary products are in-
volved. For example, if liability were imposed on manufacturers only in such extreme cases,
courts would not be routinely second-guessing discretionary decisions of the government. Only
those products which are obviously defective and extraordinarily dangerous could be sources of
liability. Likewise, any potential circumvention of the discretionary function exception to the
FICA is outweighed by the need to provide manufacturers with incentives to avoid needless and
certain injuries and loss of life. Furthermore, imposing liability on manufacturers only in ex-
treme cases in which defects were obviously and extraordinarily dangerous would not result in
basic unfairness, since in such cases liability can dearly be avoided. Thus, in extreme cases in-
volving nonmilitary products it seems inappropriate to protect manufacturers from liability for
design defects even if the government is aware of the hazards associated with the product. At the
very least, courts should not provide a defense to manufacturers in extreme cases if the govern-
ment would be unable successfully to invoke the discretionary function exception.
In extreme cases involving military products which are known by both the manufacturer
and the government to be dangerous, the policy considerations in favor of a defense for manufac-
turers are stronger. It is difficult for manufacturers and courts to sit in judgment on military
policy decisions, even when an extraordinarily dangerous defect seems apparent. See In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1054 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Furthermore, it would be
unfair to expose manufacturers to liability for a design defect after they were compelled . to pro-
duce military products under threat of fines or imprisonment. See text and notes at notes 202 and
208 supra. Therefore, manufacturers compelled under power of the Defense Production Act to
produce military products known by the government to be extraordinarily dangerous should not
be exposed to liability for defects in those products. Even where manufacturers were not com-
pelled to produce, the need to allow broad discretion to military policy-makers requires that
manufacturers be held liable for producing a defectively designed military product only in excep-
tional cases. Therefore, in cases where the manufacturer voluntarily performed the contract,
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In neither the military nor the nonmilitary context, however, do public
policy considerations justify the potential inequities of barring recovery for a
design defect when the defect was or should have been obvious to the manufac-
turer but was unknown to the government. If the contract specification defense
uniformly were available against actions for negligent design, manufacturers
and courts would not be second-guessing the discretionary decisions of coor-
dinate branches of government. 285
 Since manufacturers normally would not be
liable when the defect was known to the government, courts ordinarily would
not have to evaluate the correctness of government decisions once it is
established that the government knew of a defect or hazard. 288 Manufacturers,
for their part, would not have to second-guess government decisions. Ordinari-
ly a warning to the government of a particular defect or hazard would
discharge a manufacturer from further responsibility for the defect by making
the defect known to the government."' Likewise, any circumvention of the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA would be practically elimi-
nated. 288
 There should be few cases in which the government could claim
immunity under the discretionary function exception for a defect or hazard of
which it was unaware and did not consciously consider. 289
 Thus, any liability
imposed on manufacturers in such cases would not circumvent the govern-
ment's immunity. For reasons similar to those just discussed, the contract
specification defense would not result in basic unfairness to manufacturers by
forcing them to choose between failing to produce and thus violating the
Defense Production Act 29° or subjecting themselves to liability."' Manufactur-
ers could avoid liability for design defects by warning the government of ob-
vious defects in the design of their products. 292
recovery should be permitted only if the product's design was obviously defective and extraor-
dinarily dangerous after allowing for all possible military considerations. In other words, only
when the product's dangers were so obviously out of line with the product's intended purpose
that no reasonable manufacturer could presume that there were military considerations justifying
the design should a manufacturer be held liable.
285 See text and notes at notes 268-70 supra.
"6 See note 284 supra for a discussion of extreme cases in which manufacturer liability
for defects known to the government may be appropriate.
267
 Responsibility for a design defect is normally shifted from the manufacturer if the
defect is discovered by the government. See text and notes at notes 282-84 supra. It follows that a
warning to the government should produce the same result. The manufacturer should be entitled
to assume that its warnings will be heeded, so long as the product is safe for use if the warning is
followed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). Therefore, there
may be extreme cases, such as those discussed in note 284 supra, in which a warning would not be
sufficient to discharge a manufacturer's responsibility for a defect in design. In such cases the
manufacturer would have to decline to produce.
288
 See text and notes at notes 251-59 supra for a discussion of the concern by courts for
the circumvention of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA.
289
 See note 1 supra.
29° See note 202 supra.
291 See text and note at note 271-73 supra.
292
 See notes 284 and 287 for a discussion of extreme cases in which a warning may not
be adequate.
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Consistent with general principles of negligence, the failure to warn of a
product's dangers should offer a separate basis for recovery in cases involving
military and nonmilitary products. This cause of action should be available
even where technically the product is not defectly designed or manufactured. 293
Some courts, in cases involving public contracts, have suggested that the stand-
ard for determining whether a manufacturer has a duty to warn should be con-
sistent with the standard for determining liability under the contract specifica-
tion defense. 294 These courts have indicated that there may be a duty to warn
when a product is "obviously" or "extraordinarily" dangerous. 295 The author
agrees that manufacturers should have a duty to warn the government only of
obvious defects or dangers associated with their products. 296 The rationale
underlying the contract specification defense for limiting a manufacturer's
liability for design defects seems applicable to failure to warn cases as well. For
example, it is said that a contractor who complies with the specifications of
another is in general entitled to rely on the specifications and has only a limited
duty to question them. 297 This lessened duty is said to be justified because the
average contractor does not have the requisite expertise or resources to
evaluate fully every set of specifications provided to him.'" The same rationale
justifies a more limited duty to warn as well. Furthermore, the proposed stand-
ard avoids the confusion that might result from having a standard of recovery
in actions for a failure to warn that is different from the standard of recovery in
actions for design defects. This standard also ensures that the contract
specification defense is not circumvented and rendered meaningless through
the availability of a more easily satisfied standard of recovery for a failure to
warn than for a defect in design. 299 Since there is generally no duty to warn a
person of a danger which is known or obvious to that person,'" the standard
being suggested generally would require the manufacturer to alert the govern-
ment only of dangers which are or should be obvious to the manufacturer but
293 See text and notes at notes 15-16 supra.
294
 See text and notes at notes 100-06 supra.
2" The formulation for determining when there is a duty to warn may depend on the
precise manner in which a court articulates the contract specification defense. See text and notes
at notes 100-06 supra.
296 General duty to warn principles require a warning to foreseeable users of the prod-
uct. See note 106 supra. In the case of products sold to the government, however, the government
and its employees would seem ordinarily to be the foreseeable users. Furthermore, it has been
held that a warning to the person in charge of the user is sufficient to discharge a duty to warn,
when the user is an employee. Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263, 1273
(9th Cir. 1969). Cf. Littlehale v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 798-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (if no warning is required by manufacturer to purchaser because purchaser
knows of product's dangers, there is no duty to warn the employees of the purchaser), aff'd, 380
F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). Therefore, a manufacturer normally should be able to discharge its duty
to warn through written correspondence to appropriate levels of the government.
29' See text and notes at notes 29 and 41-43 supra.
299 See text and note at note 42 supra.
299 See text and notes at notes 99-101 supra.
909 See note 19 supra.
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which are not known or obvious to the government. Thus, a duty to warn
might arise where there was a flaw in the drafting of specifications, where the
manufacturer possessed superior knowledge of the characteristics of the prod-
uct or where a danger or defect which was not apparent from the specifications
became apparent during the manufacturing or testing process. Thus, in the
case of military as well as nonmilitary products the contract specification
defense, together with a limited duty to warn, provides an appropriate stand-
ard of liability.
It is recognized that the standards of liability just described for manufac-
turers of military and nonmilitary products do not differ substantially from the
government contract shared immunity defense. Courts which adopt the
government contract defense could fashion an identical standard of liability by
creating an exception to the government contract defense for obvious defects or
dangers."' A similar exception was created by the court in In re Agent Orange."2
The court stated that in order to invoke the government contract defense, a
manufacturer has to prove that the government had as much knowledge of the
particular hazard or defect which caused the plaintiff's injuries as the manufac-
turer did. 95 The court stated that a manufacturer has a duty to disclose to the
government any defects or hazards of which it is aware. 504 Thus, to rephrase
the court's standard, a manufacturer which fully complies with the govern-
ment's specifications is entitled to a complete defense to any action based on
defective design, unless the manufacturer knew of a design defect of which the
government 'was unaware. This standard is very similar to the contract
specification defense, except that the court did not use the word "obvious" to
describe the defect in the specifications. It would seem, however, that a defect
which is actually known to a manufacturer is thereby rendered obvious to that
manufacturer regardless of whether it might be objectively obvious to a
reasonably competent manufacturer. One potential difference, however, be-
tween the Agent Orange court's standard and the contract specification defense is
that the court may require actual knowledge of a defect or hazard on the part of
a manufacturer before it would refuse to allow the government contract
defense. 305 The court did not indicate whether it would impose liability if a
defect were so obvious that a reasonably competent manufacturer would be put
on notice, as the contract specification provides. The court's failure to indicate
whether constructive knowledge of a defect precludes the raising of the defense
may not be a significant departure from the contract specification defense.
Nevertheless, limiting the liability of manufacturers to cases in which there was
actual knowledge of a defect could produce the anomalous result of encourag-
'°' Some courts already have adopted this standard or a variation thereof. See text and
note at note 143 supra.
3°2 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
3 °3 Id. at 1055.
3" Id. at 1057.
°° See text and note at note 218 supra.
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ing manufacturers to know as little as possible about the dangers of their prod-
ucts. To avoid this result, manufacturers should be liable for failure to disclose
defects which are or should be obvious to them.
Thus, a defense similar to the contract specification defense has been
shown to be an appropriate standard of liability in negligence actions. This
defense was shown to be justified in part, however, because it is consistent with
negligence principles. The question remains whether the standards of liability
suggested above should apply even in strict liability actions. Since the justifica-
tion that this standard of liability makes sense under negligence principles no
longer will be available with respect to actions brought under a theory of strict
liability, the contest will be between two competing sets of policy concerns. On
the one hand, strong policy concerns support the proposed limited defense.
These concerns are some of the same ones expressed in support of the shared
immunity defense. On the other hand, important policies also support the
theory of strict products liability. For identification purposes, the standard of
liability proposed above will continue to be referred to as the contract specifica-
tion defense.
2. Strict Liability Theory
Whether manufacturers of defectively designed products should be able to
invoke the contract specification defense in actions based on a theory of strict
liability is a difficult question. If the defense is allowed to be raised, the
manufacturer's liability should be governed by the standards just described for
negligence actions.'" If manufacturers cannot raise the defense against actions
in strict liability, manufacturers will be liable for any design defects in their
products to the same extent as if the product's design were their own. 307 Courts
which have addressed whether the contract specification defense should bar
recovery in a strict liability action have split about evenly on the issue in actions
against both private contractors and government contractors. 308 Those courts
which have rejected the availability of the contract specification defense in a
strict liability action have reasoned that the contract specification defense has
been applied primarily in negligence cases. These courts reason that under
strict liability theory it is not necessary that the defect be caused by the act or
omission of the defendant. 3 " Courts which allow the contract specification
defense in a strict liability action emphasize that it is illogical to hold a party
who has not designed a product liable for a design defect. 31 ° One way of testing
which view is correct is to determine whether the policies underlying strict
products liability remain valid where a manufacturer builds a product accord-
ing to the government's design. Those policies which remain valid must be
306 Set text and notes at notes 278-300 supra.
307 See text and notes at notes 68-71 supra.
3" See text and notes at notes 61-94 supra.
309 See text and notes at notes 61 and 69 supra.
910 See text and note at note 88 supra.
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weighed against the public policy concerns which support providing a defense
for manufacturers. Some of the same public policy concerns cited by courts in
favor of the government contract defense also support the proposed contract
specification defense. The policies supporting the theory of strict liability for
manufacturers of defectively designed products will be addressed first.
Holding manufacturers of defective products strictly liable for injuries
caused by those products has been justified on several grounds. First, it is
asserted that by marketing a product, the manufacturer represents to the
public that the product is safe for its intended use. Therefore, the manufacturer
should be held liable for any breach of this representation . 3 " This policy
justification is analogous to the theory of an implied warranty running from a
seller to the ultimate user of a product. Where the design of a product is dic-
tated by the government, however, it is difficult to see how a manufacturer
makes such an implied representation. Under traditional warranty principles,
normally the only warranty made by a manufacturer who builds a product in
response to a purchaser's specifications is the express warranty that the product
will comply with the purchaser's specifications. 312 Implied warranties either
are displaced by this express warranty or fail to come into existence due to the
absence of reliance by the buyer on the manufacturer. 3 " Therefore, this policy
justification supporting strict liability does not seem consistent with the war-
ranty theory on which it is based.
A second justification for holding manufacturers strictly liable for defects
in their products is that they can allocate the risk of harm among all the pur-
chasers of their products. 314 This theory is premised upon the manufacturer
selling a large volume of products to a large number of customers. The
manufacturer's cost of insurance simply becomes an additional cost of produc-
ing the products. Under these circumstances, the added cost of insurance is
distributed in such a way that the incremental cost to each consumer is small.
Where a manufacturer sells a specially designed product to the government,
however, the entire cost of insurance is passed directly to the government as the
sole consumer. Thus, the issue becomes whether the ability of manufacturers
to allocate to the government the increased cost of insurance resulting from ex-
posure to potential tort claims justifies holding manufacturers of defectively
designed government products strictly liable. Significantly, the same allocation
of cost principle has been cited by courts as a reason to limit the liability of
manufacturers. 3" These courts suggest that it is undesirable to add to the cost
of government. 3 ' 6 The author has argued that increased government cost is not
a valid reason for limiting the liability of manufacturers, at least in cases in-
311 See PROSSER, supra note 19, at 651.
3" See note 98 supra.
313 Id.
314 See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1120-22 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault].
313 See text and notes at notes 260-63 supra.
315 Id.
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volving nonmilitary products. 3 " The shifting of increased costs to the govern-
ment is sometimes the unavoidable consequence of legitimate changes in the
tort law." At the same time, however, the fact that insurance costs will be
shifted to the government is not a valid rationale for imposing liability on
manufacturers either. To propose increased liability for manufacturers solely
because the cost will be borne by the government and ultimately by taxpayers
is tantamount to advocating the use of the judicial system as a taxing
mechanism. If other justifications can be found for imposing strict liability,
however, then there is some basis for allowing the unavoidable, albeit
undesirable, increased costs to be borne by the government. In short, the
allocation of risk argument is not a valid rationale for imposing liability on the
manufacturers of defectively designed government products.
Third, it is argued that manufacturers are in the best position to minimize
risks associated with their products and that the threat of liability creates an in-
centive to the manufacturer to produce a safe products" In the case where the
design is completely specified by the government, however, the manufacturer
has no discretion to create a safer design. The manufacturer must either accept
the government's terms or lose the contract. 32° Thus, manufacturers faced with
the threat of strict liability basically would have two options when presented
with a set of government specifications which might contain design defects.
Manufacturers either could decline to produce, or could include the cost of ad-
ditional insurance in their bids. Presumably, most manufacturers simply
would pass along to the government the cost of additional insurance. Thus, in
most cases the threat of liability will not create an effective incentive to make
safer products.
Perhaps it could be argued that in a limited class of cases an effective in-
centive to build safer products can be created. For example, the prospect of be-
ing held strictly liable for design defects might make manufacturers more con-
scientious in looking for such defects which may be unknown to the govern-
ment. Upon discovering such defects, the manufacturer would then point out
such defects to the government, which could correct the specifications. By be-
ing more conscientious in looking for design defects, the manufacturer
theoretically could reduce the cost of its insurance and remain more com-
petitive. A nearly identical result, however, could be achieved simply by im-
posing liability on the manufacturer for obvious defects."' The incremental in-
centive to discover inadvertent errors in specifications that might be achieved
by imposing strict liability for design defects where the design is exclusively
controlled by the government would be highly speculative. 322
317
 Id.
318 Id.
319 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 454-57, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) (Traymor, J., concurring); Prosser, The Assault, supra note 296, at 1119-20.
32° See note 2 supra.
321 Set text at notes 278-300 supra.
322 See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 314, at 1119.
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A fourth reason advanced to support holding manufacturers of defective
products strictly liable is that it already is possible to hold manufacturers strict-
ly liable by resort to a series of actions." The first step in this series is to hold
the retailer liable on a warranty to his purchaser. 3" Indemnity on a warranty
then is sought successively from other suppliers, until the manufacturer finally
pays the damages. 325 Each step in this series of actions presupposes the ex-
istence of an express or implied warranty of merchantability or fitness running
from the seller of the product to the purchaser. As each seller is held liable to his
purchaser for a breach of his implied warranty, he in turn sues the one who
sold him the product. Since each action in the series is based on a breach of
warranty, fault is not an issue and the standard of proof essentially is the same
as in a strict liability action. 326 Resort to this series of actions, however, is a
wasteful and time-consuming process. Instead, a direct action in strict liability
against the manufacturer is considered justified."' This reasoning, however,
has no application to cases involving design specifications provided to
manufacturers by the government. Plaintiffs typically are not purchasers from
the government, but are employees or other third parties who have been in-
jured by government products . 328 Therefore, most plaintiffs will not have a
breach of warranty action against the government. 329 Since these plaintiffs do
not have a breach of warranty action available, the first step in the hypothetical
series of actions fails.
Those plaintiffs who have purchased the defective product from the
government may have a breach of warranty claim against the government.
Unlike most retailers, however, the government generally may not seek indem-
nity from the manufacturer, if the government has provided design specifica-
tions for the product to the manufacturer. The reason the government cannot
seek indemnity is that when the government provides a contractor with design
specifications, an implied warranty of suitability and adequacy attaches to the
specifications. 33° As a result, where a defect in design is attributable to a defect
in those specifications, the government normally would be unable to recover
from the manufacturer for breach of warranty."' Thus, it can be seen that a
series of warranty actions, leading ultimately to the liability of the manufac-
323 See PROSSER, supra note 19, at 651.
32+ Id
325 Id.
376 See text and notes at notes 7-14 supra.
327 PROSSER, supra note 19, at 651.
328 See text and notes at notes 62-75 and 161-219 supra.
328 Perhaps a more relevant question is whether such employees or third parties have a
direct cause of action against the manufacturer as third party beneficiaries to the contract be-
tween the manufacturer and the government. In order to answer this question in the affirmative,
one must conclude that the contract specification defense is ineffective against a breach of war-
ranty action. Yet, what little authority there is suggests that the contract specification defense is
effective against a breach of warranty action. See text and notes at notes 95-98 supra.
33° See note 52 supra.
331 Id.
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turer, generally is not possible where the government has provided design
specifications for a product. Therefore, this rationale has no merit in cases in-
volving design specifications provided to manufacturers by the government.
Finally, it is argued that the public interest in health and safety requires
manufacturers to bear the responsibility for any harm caued by defects in the
products they sell to consumers. 332 This concern is related to the desire to pro-
vide strong incentives to manufacture safe products."' It also is related to the
policy reason given by the court in Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann* for imposing
strict liability.'" In Challoner, the court admitted that not all of the policies sup-
porting the theory of strict liability were present in cases involving products
sold to the government.'" The court concluded, however, that the most basic
policy reason was present: to insure that the costs of injuries from defective
products are borne by manufacturers who put them on the market and not by
innocent users who are powerless to protect themselves. 337 This rationale does
seem applicable to cases where the government provides defective design
specifications to a manufacturer.
Thus, the only policy reason supporting the theory of strict products
liability which remains applicable in the context of design specifications dic-
tated by the government is the desire to have the cost of injuries borne by those
who manufacture defective products rather than by innocent users. Weighing
against this policy, however, are some of the concerns that have influenced
courts to provide manufacturers with the government contract defense. For ex-
ample, it frequently may be unfair to hold a manufacturer liable when the
government had exclusive control over design of a product. 338 Where the defect
which caused the injury was within the government's discretion and was not
obvious to the manufacturer, the responsible party really is the government.
The manufacturer in such cases is in no position to make the product safer. If it
refuses to follow the specifications after accepting the contract, it may be in
breach of contract. In addition to being unfair, holding a manufacturer strictly
liable for defects in designs provided by the government would permit excessive
circumvention of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. 339 Strict
liability would circumvent the discretionary function exception to the FTCA in
all design defect cases in which the government had exercised a discretionary
3 ' 2 See PROSSER, supra note 19, at 651.
3" See text and notes at notes 319-22, supra.
"4 512 F.2c1•77 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for misapplication of conflict of laws rules,
423 U.S. 3 (1975).
"S Id. at 84. See text at notes 72-74 supra.
336 Id.
" 7 Id.
"I' If it is in the public interest to compensate plaintiffs injured by products manufac-
tured according to government specifications, perhaps action should be taken by Congress, the
body which traditionally provides for the public welfare. Perhaps changes are needed in the
Federal Tort Claims Act to ensure that when the government is responsible, it pays. See note 1
supra.
"9 See text and notes at notes 251-59 supra.
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function in choosing a particular design. Likewise, courts would be required
routinely to sit in judgment over discretionary decisions made by policy-
making branches of the government. Therefore, in conclusion, it is submitted
that the policy of shifting the cost of injuries from innocent users of defectively
designed products to manufacturers, standing alone, does not justify curtailing
the availability of the contract specification defense in a strict liability action.
In cases involving military products, additional policy reasons support
limiting the liability of manufacturers in strict liability actions. Imposing strict
liability on manufacturers for defects in designs specified by the government
could interfere with the government's ability to formulate policy and make
judgments pursuant to its war powers.'" Government agencies in some cases
might be forced to expend limited resources to compel reluctant manufacturers
to produce highly dangerous but necessary products. Furthermore, it is par-
ticularly unfair to hold a manufacturer strictly liable for design defects in prod-
ucts which it has been ordered to produce under authority of the Defense Pro-
duction Act according to government mandated specifications over which the
manufacturer had no control."' In view of these considerations, the contract
specification defense should be available in a strict liability action. Recovery
should be permitted for defectively designed products in a strict liability action
only to the extent recovery would be permitted in a negligence action. Thus, a
manufacturer should be liable for a design defect only if the design was ob-
viously defective and dangerous. If the defect was discovered by or was obvious
to the government, however, the manufacturer normally should not be liable
for a design defect. Therefore, a manufacturer normally should be able to pro-
tect itself from liability for design defects by warning the government of ob-
vious defects. A manufacturer should be liable for failure to warn the govern-
ment of defects or dangers which were or should have been obvious to the
manufacturer but which were not obvious to the government.
3. Breach of Warranty Theory
The question whether the contract specification defense is available in an
action against a government contractor based on breach of warranty has not
been resolved by the courts. 342 It has been suggested that the contract specifica-
tion defense, with its "unless obviously dangerous" limitation prescribes what
essentially is a negligence standard of liability.'" Therefore, it may seem
peculiar to allow a defense traditionally relegated to negligence cases to be
raised in actions based on warranty theory. Yet, in an analogous situation
courts have held that a failure to warn can constitute a breach of warranty
although liability for failure to warn appears to be governed by a negligence
340 See text and notes at notes 264-70 supra.
341 See text and notes at notes 271-73 supra.
342 See text and notes at notes 95-98 supra.
3" See text and note at note 22 supra.
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standards" Furthermore, one court, in a case involving a private contract,
stated that the contract specification defense was available in a breach of war-
ranty action. 345 Thus, there would seem to be no barrier to allowing the con-
tract specification defense in breach of warranty actions. For the sake of con-
sistency, this defense should be available in breach of warranty actions. Thus,
a manufacturer should be liable for a design defect only if the design was ob-
viously defective and dangerous. If the defect was discovered by or was obvious
to the government, however, the manufacturer normally should not be liable
for a design defect. Therefore, a manufacturer normally should be able to pro-
tect itself from liability for design defects by warning the government of ob-
vious defects. A manufacturer should be liable for failure to warn the govern-
ment of defects or dangers which were or should have been obvious to the
manufacturer but where were not obvious to the government.
CONCLUSION
A manufacturer which constructs a defectively designed product in full
compliance with government specifications can invoke two defenses against
plaintiffs seeking to recover in tort for injuries caused by such products. These
two defenses are the "contract specification" defense, which is based on
negligence principles, and the "government contract" defense, which is based
on a concept of shared immunity. The contract specification defense provides
that a manufacturer is not liable for damages or injuries caused by products
manufactured in accordance with government specifications, unless the
specifications were so obviously defective and dangerous that a competent
manufacturer would have declined to follow them. In contrast, the government
contract defense, as expressed by some courts, provides that a manufacturer's
compliance with government specifications is a complete defense to any action
based on defective design. The manufacturer may not be liable even if the
defect in the specifications was obvious. Under both defenses, if the manufac-
turer had discretion in the manner of performing the contract, it may be
precluded from invoking the defense.
Manufacturers defending themselves in products liability actions based on
the defective design of products sold to the federal government have begun to
invoke these defenses, so far with moderate success. In the case of military
products, the majority view is that some form of government contract defense
protects the manufacturer against plaintiffs suing in negligence, strict liability,
or breach of warranty. The minority view is that compliance with specifications
is not a defense under a strict liability theory. In nonmilitary product liability
cases there is not yet a clear indication of the standards of liability. The govern-
ment contract defense has not yet been allowed in cases involving nonmilitary
'" See note 19 supra.
3" See text and notes at notes 95-98 supra.
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products. The contract specification defense, however, may be raised to defeat
most negligence actions for defective design. There is a split of authority,
however, as to whether the contract specification defense is available to
manufacturers sued under a theory of strict liability. In addition, it is unclear
whether manufacturers sued for breach of warranty can raise the defense suc-
cessfully. Nor is it clear to what extent a manufacturer can be held liable for a
failure to warn even though it successfully can invoke either of the two
defenses.
This note concludes that the government contract defense, as expressed by
some courts, is overly broad and provides no incentive to manufacturers to
avoid reckless conduct. In a suit for injuries caused by a defectively designed
military or nonmilitary product, a manufacturer should be able to invoke a
defense similar to the contract specification defense. The defense should be
available to the manufacturer whether it is sued under a theory of negligence,
breach of warranty, or strict liability. Thus, where a manufacturer has fully
complied with government specifications which contain a defect in design, it
would be liable only when the design was obviously defective and dangerous.
In determining whether the design defect was or should have been obvious, any
special knowledge or skill of the manufacturer should be taken into considera-
tion. If the defect was discovered by or was obvious to the government,
however, the manufacturer normally should not be liable for a design defect.
Therefore, a manufacturer normally should be able to avoid liability for design
defects by warning the government of obvious defects. A manufacturer should
be liable for a failure to warn the government of defects and dangers in its prod-
uct which were or should have been obvious to the manufacturer but which
were not obvious to the government.
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